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I 
INTRODUCTION 
Asked to resolve a social issue, Americans today turn readily to rights 1 and 
to the Constitution that is understood to embody them. Many "vice" issues 
have long been thought particularly apt for a rights analysis. A constitutional 
resolution of vice issues is therefore inevitably a possibility, and its wisdom is 
inevitably a question. In this essay, I want to address that question by 
investigating an area of the law that has been recently constitutionalized-
family law. Family law is an example worth studying because rights thinking 
has won a considerable prominence in it: The Constitution has been used to 
transform some major aspects of family law and to cast a shadow on many 
others. In addition, rights thinking of a more general kind-influenced by 
constitutional ideas, but not exclusively constitutional-has come to shape 
much thought, legal and lay, about both family law and family life. Family law 
has not only had illuminating experience with rights thinking and 
constitutionalization; its experience has been with the most relevant form of 
each. For if vice issues are constitutionalized, it probably will be through the 
doctrinal framework of fourteenth amendment "privacy" rights developed 
and applied in family law cases.2 
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I. See, e.g .. Stewart, Federalism and Rights, 19 GEo. L. REv. 917 (1985); Westen, The Rueful 
Rhetoric of "Rights,'' 33 UCLA L. REv. 977 (1986). 
2. Indeed, to some extent I will be directly discussing "vice" issues or issues (like abortion) 
which are associated with true "vice issues." I have in mind, of course, family law legislation that 
might be thought to have primarily a "moral" justification-that is, the kind of legislation which has 
been controverted since Mill and Stephen and Hart and Devlin. Such legislation includes some kinds 
of statutes regulating entrance into marriage (polygamy and incest statutes, for example), statutes 
prohibiting non-marital sexual relations (fornication, cohabitation, adultery, and prostitution 
statutes, for example), some kinds of statutes governing reproductive activities (abortion, 
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I do not, however, intend (or perhaps need) to take on the entire sweep of 
problems privacy rights present; rather, I wish to examine the unexamined. 
As the lawyers among my readers will know, constitutional doctrine divides 
decisions about statutes challenged in terms of fundamental fourteenth 
amendment privacy rights into two parts: First, does the statute infringe some 
individual right? Second, is some state interest nevertheless powerful enough 
to justify the statute? Most writing about privacy rights is devoted to the 
pleasures of identifying, describing, and defending individual rights. The 
state-interest side of the constitutional formula is generally scanted. I wish to 
redress that balance by investigating the role of the state's interest in 
legislation that impinges on privacy rights. In doing so, I will hope to learn 
more about the desirability of using the fourteenth amendment to approach 
family law problems generally and "vice" issues specifically. 
This symposium on vice will attract laymen as well as lawyers. I hope that 
this essay will speak to both audiences. However, it has two sections. In the 
first-part II-I analyze in conventional legal terms some doctrinal aspects of 
the Court's treatment of state interests. Specifically, I examine the Court's 
travails in developing tests to use in state-interest analysis, in defining the 
terms of those tests, and in applying them. In the essay's second section-
parts III through V-I address rather more speculatively some broader 
aspects of a constitutionalized family law. Particularly, I ask whether states 
may define their interests in broader terms than the Court has so far 
contemplated and whether the Court's constricted state-interest analysis has 
had deleterious political and social consequences. Both sections of the essay, 
I believe, engage the question ofhow far family law and vice issues should be 
constitutionalized, but the first section-because it takes doctrine seriously-
may be of livelier interest to lawyers than to social scientists. Thus, I counsel 
the lay reader to consider turning directly to the second section, which begins 
at part III. 
I undertake this topic with some hesitation. First, it treats only one side of 
a two-sided problem: To analyze the state interests in a statute or in the 
abstract without assessing the personal rights they confront and without 
weighing the two claims against each other is to leave important issues 
unexplored and one's ultimate conclusions about rights analysis unformed.3 
Second, the topic is complex, and even in the generous space I have been 
permitted, I can only sketch a rough chart of my argument, one devoid of the 
cross-currents, eddies, depths, and shoals which are already too blithely and 
too hazardously ignored in explorations of constitutional rights.4 
contraception. and adolescent sexual relations), and ~tatutes prohibiting what are understood to be 
deviant sexual relations (homosexuality). 
3. My own ultimate conclusions about these statutes are indeed incomplete. I have, however, 
begun to examine the rights side of the equation in Schneider, Rights Discourse and Neonatal Euthanasia, 
76 CALIF. L. REV. 151 (1988). 
4. Not only will I be unable to develop fully all the arguments I make, but I will ignore a 
number of aspects of state-interest analyses. For example, I will not discuss the extent to which a 
legislature must actually have relied on or the state's lawyer actually have advanced a justification for 
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Perhaps at this point I owe laymen a word of explanation and lawyers a 
word of reminder about the doctrinal framework of the fourteenth 
amendment doctrine of "substantive due process," for it is that doctrine in 
which the right of privacy is embedded. The due process clause of the 
fourteenth amendment provides that no state shall "deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... " This clause on its 
face seems to create only procedural limits on the power of government, but it 
has in two periods in history been taken to impose substantive limits as well. 
The first such period was the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
when the Court interpreted the clause as guaranteeing various laissez-faire 
economic freedoms, particularly the freedom of contract.5 The second such 
period has been the last twenty years, when the Court has interpreted the 
clause as guaranteeing a right to "privacy." Constitutional privacy has an 
artificial meaning most easily understood by looking at the specific rights it 
has been held to encompass. An authoritative formulation states: "the right 
has some extension to activities relating to marriage, ... procreation, ... 
contraception, ... family relationships, ... and child rearing and education. " 6 
The right to privacy is a "fundamental" right, and statutes that infringe such 
rights bear a heavy burden of justification: They must be "necessary" to serve 
a "compelling state interest." In contrast, the ordinary run of statutes is 
presumed to be constitutional and thus needs only be "rationally related" to a 
"permissible state purpose." 7 Generally, the decision which test to apply has 
been outcome-determinative. That is, statutes to which the compelling-state-
interest test is applied are almost invariably found unconstitutional; statutes 
to which the rationally-related test is applied are almost invariably upheld. 
a statute before a court may consider that justification. Nor, to take another example, will I attempt 
to canvass all the interests that ought to be "compelling." Nor, again, will I fully e';amine the 
interactions between state-interest analysis in privacy cases and in other forms of c.:>nstitutional 
adjudication. This piece is, as its title indicates, an essay, not a treatise (or even a law review article): 
In it, I reflect on some central features of state-interest analysis; I do not detail and dissect every 
feature of it. 
5. This period is commonly referred to as the Lochner era, after Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 
45 (1904), in which the Court held that a.statute limiting the working hours of bakery employees (in 
order to limit the harmful effects of flour dust on workers) violated the right of employees freely to 
contract with employers. 
6. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973). 
7. A few fundamental-rights "privacy" cases arise under the fourteenth amendment's equal 
protection clause. For our purposes, equal protection analysis closely resembles substantive-due-
process analysis. Equal protection cases test the legitimacy of legislative classifications that result in 
differential treatment of similarly situated people. When a legislative classification implicates a 
fundamental right (privacy, in our cases) or when it uses a suspect classification (such as race), it must 
be "strictly scrutinized" to see if it meets the same heavy burden of justification used in substantive-
due-process analysis. When a legislative classification does not implicate a fundamental right, it need 
only meet the light burden of justification. For an illuminating discussion of the Court's use of such 
formulaic tests, see Nagel, The Formulaic Constitution, 84 MICH. L. REv. 165 (1985). 
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II 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE STATE-INTEREST TESTS 
In this part, I will suggest that the state-interest side of the ·substantive-
due-process ledger has generally not been well handled by courts and 
commentators: courts have had problems articulating and applying a test; 
commentators have scanted those problems.8 I will suggest that the judicial 
awkwardness and scholarly inattention are due to some basic dilemmas of 
fourteenth amendment privacy doctrine. To locate those dilemmas, I will 
examine three areas of difficulty. The first such area lies in the Supreme 
Court's failure to devise a satisfactory standard of review; the second lies in its 
failure to decide what its chosen standard of review means; the third lies in its 
failure to apply that standard sensitively and sensibly. 
A. The Uncertain Standard of Review 
The first area of difficulty with state-interest analysis-the Court's failure 
to devise a satisfactory standard of review-is signaled by the fact that the 
present standard is less firmly established than one might suppose. Many 
recent cases, of course, recite the conventional understanding I described 
earlier-that a statute which infringes a "fundamental" right must be 
"necessary" to promote a "compelling state interest." However, this test is 
something of a novelty in privacy law, and even now it is not regularly used. 
The novelty of the modern test is notable enough to warrant a brief history 
of the Court's struggles to find a satisfactory standard of review in privacy 
cases. The origins of the privacy right lie in the 1920's, in two cases from the 
first period of substantive due process-Meyer v. Nebraska 9 and Pierce v. Society 
of Sisters 10-each of which involved statutes limiting parents' choices about 
their children's education. Meyer and Pierce used the old (and by modern 
standards tame) 11 substantive-due-process standard of review: "rights 
guaranteed by the Constitution may not be abridged by legislation which has 
no reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the 
8. For one exam:pte of a commentator's treatment, see-the otherwise droll-Note, Fornication, 
Cohabitation, and the Constitution, 77 MICH. L. REv. 252 (1978}, which displays the commentator's 
typical uninterest in the state-interest problem by managing to spend 45 pages on the fundamental-
rights issue and only nine pages on the state's interests. Commentators have, however, devoted 
more considerable attention to state-interests aspects of "rationality" review, to, that is, the question 
of the kind of review" appropriate to a statute that does not infringe a fundamental right or create a 
suspect classification. See Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model 
for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. I (1972); Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEBR. L. 
REv. 197 ( 1976); Bennett, "Mere" Rationality in Constitutional Law: judicial Review and Democratic Theory, 
67 CALIF. L. REV. 1049 (1979); Bice, Rationality Analysis in Constitutional Law, 65 MINN. L. REV. 1 
(1980); Michelman, Politics and Values or What's Really Wrong with Rationality Review?, 13 CREIGHTON L. 
REv. 487 (1979). 
9. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
10. 268 u.s. 510 (1925). 
11. It bears emphasizing that the standard of review in the Lochner era (that the law have "a 
reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the state") was, at least in principle, 
markedly more forgiving than the modem era's standard. 
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State." 12 In 1942, in Skinner v. Oklahoma 13 (an equal protection case not then 
thought related to Meyer and Pierce but now sometimes taken to be), the Court 
said that, since legislation requiring the sterilization of anyone who 
committed three felonies implicated "one of the basic civil rights of man," 
"strict scrutiny" of the classification was necessary. 14 However, strict scrutiny 
did not then, as it does now, require courts to use the modern standard of 
review; in Skinner it seemed only to mean something more demanding than 
the usual degree of deference to legislative decisions. Finally, in the last of 
the four early privacy cases, Prince v. Massachusetts, 15 the Court said, "[W]hen 
state action impinges upon a claimed religious freedom, it must fall unless 
shown to be necessary for or conducive to the child's protection against some 
clear and present danger .... " 16 In sum, the early privacy cases introduced 
neither the modern rigorous standard of review nor indeed any single 
standard of review. 
Nor did the compelling-state-interest standard appear in the avatar of the 
modern privacy right, Griswold v. Connecticut. 17 Rather, in overturning a statute 
prohibiting the use of contraceptives, the Griswold Court quoted NAACP v. 
Alabama 18 to the effect that a " 'governmental purpose to control or prevent 
activities constitutionally subject to state regulation may not be achieved by 
means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of 
protected freedoms.' " 19 Griswold's doctrinal foundation was too ingenious 
and too idiosyncratic permanently to support a strong privacy right, and so 
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 20 an equal protection case that overturned a statute 
regulating the distribution of contraceptives, might seem that right's real 
basis. But, like Griswold, Eisenstadt invoked a modest test-that a classification 
"must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of 
difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, 
12. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 ( 1925). 
13. 316 u.s. 535 (1942). 
14. !d. at 541. 
15. 321 u.s. 158 (1944). 
16. /d. at 167. The presence in the opinion of language generous to the view that parents have 
important rights over their children's well-being makes it easy to forget that Prince actually affirmed 
the conviction of a guardian who had taken her ward to sell the Watch Tower in violation of child-labor 
laws. Prince did so because of the state's expansively described interest in "the healthy, well-rounded 
growth of young people into full maturity as citizens, with all that implies." !d. at 168. 
17. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Griswold was preceded by Justice Harlan's influential dissent in Poe v. 
Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961), a case in which the Court disposed on standing grounds of a 
challenge to the same statute prohibiting the use of contraceptives that was reviewed in Griswold. 
Justice Harlan reached the substantive question and wrote, 
The statute must pass a more rigorous Constitutional test than that going merely to the 
plausibility of its underlying rationale .... This enactment involves what ... must be granted to 
be a most fundamental aspect of "liberty", ... and it is this which requires that the statute be 
subjected to "strict scrutiny". Skinner v. Oklahoma, [316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)] .... 
367 U.S. at 548 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
18. 377 u.s. 288, 307 (1958). 
19. 381 U.S. at 485. 
20. 405 u.s. 438 (1972). 
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so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike. " 21 Perhaps 
significantly, it was not until Roe v. Wade, 22 analytically the most problematic 
and politically the most controversial of the Court's privacy cases, that the 
"modern" test was used: "Where certain 'fundamental rights' are involved, 
the Court has held that regulation limiting these rights may be justified only 
by a 'compelling state interest,' ... and that legislative enactments must be 
narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake."23 
The modern test is not only novel, it is even now not invariably used. In 
Zablocki v. Redhail, 24 for example, the Court considered a statute which 
required that any non-custodial parent under a support order who wished to 
marry show that he had complied with the support order and that his children 
were not then and were not likely to become public charges. This statutory 
impediment to marriage seemed, as such, to call for the modern standard of 
review. However, the Court used a weaker test: "Since our past decisions 
make clear that the right to marry is of fundamental importance, and since the 
classification at issue here significantly interferes with the exercise of that 
right, we believe that 'critical examination' of the state interests advanced in 
support of the classification is required."25 
As Zablocki indicates, the Court sometimes fails to invoke the standard its 
own doctrine seems to call for. At other times, the Court enunciates no 
standard at all. 26 In both situations, explicitly or implicitly, the Court often 
seems to be using standards somewhere between the classic rational-basis and 
compelling-state-interest standards. The Court's struggles have been 
particularly evident in two kinds of cases. The first consists of cases involving 
post-Roe statutes that regulate but do not prohibit abortions. Consider, for 
instance, some of the earlier cases in that series. In Doe v. Bolton, 27 Roe's 
companion case, the Court never avowedly adopted a test, but it repeatedly 
used language-"reasonably related," "legitimately related," "rational 
connection"-hinting though not establishing that it thought the rational-
basis standard appropriate. In Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. 
Danforth, 28 the Court again failed to identify the test it was applying and again 
21. !d. at 447 (quoting Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1971) (in turn quoting Royster Guano 
Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920))). 
22. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
23. /d. at 155. Before it decided Roe, the Court decided Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 
(1972), and again used a test whose articulation suggested that it was less strict than the modern test: 
"[A] State's interest in universal education, however highly we rank it, is not totally free from a 
balancing process when it impinges on fundamental rights and interests .... " /d. at 214. More 
strictly, however, the Court also said that "only those interests of the highest order and those not 
otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion." /d. at 215. The 
Court acknowledged that parental "privacy" rights were involved, but did not enunciate a separate 
test for them. 
24. 434 u.s. 374 (1978). 
25. /d. at 383. Even using this less rigorous standard of review, however, the Court found the 
statute unconstitutional. 
26. See, e.g., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977); Thornburgh v. American College of 
Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986). 
27. 410 u.s. 179 (1973). 
28. 428 u.s. 52 (1976). 
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used language-"unreasonable or arbitrary"-consistent in principle with a 
rational-basis test. In Carey v. Population Services International, 29 however, the 
Court described the post-Roe cases as holding unconstitutional 
statutes that did not prohibit abortions outright but limited in a variety of ways a 
woman's access to them .... The significance of these cases is that they establish that 
the same test must be applied to state regulations that burden an individual's right to 
decide to prevent conception or terminate pregnancy by substantially limiting access 
to the means of effectuating that decision as is applied to state statutes that prohibit 
the decision entirely. Both types of regulation "may be justified only by a 'compelling 
state interest' .... " 30 
In Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 31 the Court again confronted 
the standards problem. It said that "restrictive state regulation of the right to 
choose abortion ... must be supported by a compelling state interest."32 But 
it also said that "[c]ertain regulations that have no significant impact on the 
woman's exercise of her right may be permissible where justified by important 
state health objectives. " 33 And it added that, after the first trimester, the state 
" 'may regulate the abortion procedure to the extent that the regulation 
reasonably relates to the preservation and protection of maternal health.' " 34 
I will not weary the reader by trying to work out whether all these varying 
standards can in some technical way be reconciled with each other or with the 
assumptions of fundamental-rights analysis. It is perhaps enough to say that 
these tests have not been coherently applied in subsequent post-Roe cases 
(although the standard of review seems to be tightening). Indeed, in the 
recent case of Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 35 
the Court once again neglected to announce which test it planned to apply. 
And further complicating the issue, now as before, the question whether the 
standard the Court invokes is the standard the Court actually uses in resolving 
these cases. 
The other category of cases in which the Court has particularly struggled 
to find a state-interest standard consists of cases involving nonstandard right-
holders like minors and prisoners. In Carey v. Population Services International, 36 
a case involving access to contraceptives by both minors and adults, the Court 
began by invoking the compelling-state-interest test but later wrote, "State 
restrictions inhibiting privacy interests of minors are valid only if they serve 
'any significant state interest ... that is not present in the case of an adult.' " 37 
In Bellotti v. Baird, 38 the Court asked whether a parental consent statute 
29. 431 U.S. 678 (1976). Carey, though, was a contraception, not an abortion, case. 
30. /d. at 688. 
31. 462 u.s. 416 (1983). 
32. /d. at 427. 
33. /d. at 430. 
34. /d. at 430-31 (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973)). 
35. 476 U.S. 747 (1986). 
36. 431 u.s. 678 (1977). 
37. /d. at 693 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976)). 
The Court added, "This test is apparently less rigorous than the 'compelling state interest' test 
applied to restrictions on the privacy rights of adults." /d. at 693 n.l5. 
38. 433 u.s. 622 (1979). 
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"unduly burden[ed]" the minor's right to seek an abortion. 39 And the Court 
in H.L. v. Matheson 40 upheld a parental notification requirement against a 
minor's constitutional challenge because it "serves important state interests, 
is narrowly drawn to protect only those interests, and does not violate any 
guarantees of the Constitution."41 Finally, in Turner v. Safley, 42 a case 
involving the right of prison inmates to marry, the Court, emphasizing that it 
was dealing with a "prisoner's rights" case, said that a regulation severely 
limiting a prisoner's right to marry "is valid if it is reasonably related to 
legitimate penological interests."43 In short, the announced standard in cases 
involving nonstandard rightholders is at least as volatile as the standard in the 
post-Roe cases, and the doubts about the correspondence between the test 
invoked and the test actually used are at least as pronounced. 
The novelty of the "modern" test and the inconstancy of its application 
are perhaps not astonishing, given the novelty and uncertain scope of the 
privacy doctrine itself. In any event, the inconstancy should be measured 
against the baseline of inconstancy that is common in legal doctrines in 
complex and controversial areas. Furthermore, the degree of inconstancy has 
in one sense been moderated (albeit confusingly) by the Court's occasional 
willingness to announce a relatively mild test while actually applying the 
modern test.44 However, the novelty and inconstancy of the modern test are 
noteworthy because they give us our first hint of the extraordinary difficulty of 
state-interest analysis in fundamental-rights privacy cases. That difficulty can 
begun to be understood by briefly exploring some of the reasons for the 
novelty and inconstancy. I infer that the modern test was late in coming and 
that it is sometimes ignored because of two factors: first, the Court's 
uncertainty about the right to privacy itself and about how far it may take the 
Court; second, the Court's unwillingness to treat state interests as strong 
enough to overcome rights. 
The Court's uncertainty about the right of privacy is evidenced by the 
continuing obscurity of the term "privacy" and of the right that term 
describes. The Court has avoided defining the right; rather, it has preferred 
to proceed analogically. The right is most easily rationalized in broad Millian 
terms, and commentators have widely done so.45 The Court, however, has 
not;46 but neither has it provided an alternative interpretation. Some of the 
Court's reluctance to define the privacy right may spring from the fact that 
39. !d. al 640. 
40. 450 U.S. 405 (1981). 
41. !d. al 413. 
42. 107 S. CL. 2254 (1987). 
43. !d. aL 2261. 
44. Eisensladl v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), and Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 384 (1978), come 
readily Lo mind. This willingness Lo announce one slandard while applying anolher is nol 
uncommon in equal proleCLion cases. See, e.g., Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Cenler, 473 U.S. 432 
(1985). 
45. For a survey of commenlalors, see Grey, Eros, Civilization and the Burger Court, LAw & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1980, al 83. 
46. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986); Grey, supra nole 45; Burl, The Constitution 
of the Family, 1979 SuP. CT. REv. 329. 
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attempts to define it must provoke an unwelcome re-examination of many 
complex and controversial questions about constitutional interpretation and 
judicial review. The heart of the problem, though, is probably that privacy is a 
"greedy" concept47 whose core principle seems endlessly expansive. The 
Court itself slips easily into paraphrasing the privacy right as the even broader 
"right to be let alone." The unconfrontable problem, then, becomes finding 
principles to limit the right of privacy.48 Those limiting principles cannot be 
found in the text of the Constitution (since it never speaks of a right to 
privacy) nor in the intent of the Framers of the fourteenth amendment (since 
they did not contemplate a right to privacy) nor in a judicial definition of the 
right of privacy (since the Court has not seriously attempted to construct 
one). Indeed, the Court has rejected one limiting principle-the idea that 
privacy is the right to do what you want with your own body-because it was 
not limiting enough.49 Nevertheless, the need for limiting principles is 
palpable: the right to be let alone is ultimately the right not to be governed. 
The absence of a limiting principle has apparently concerned the Court in 
at least two respects. First, the Court has long anticipated that some family 
law regulations-like those prohibiting sodomy-seem to affront core privacy 
principles but are so deeply rooted in American history, law, moral belief, and 
popular sentiment that the Court will not overturn them.50 Second, family 
law regulates some parts of family life extensively yet unproblematically. As 
the Court wrote in Zablocki: 
By reaffirming the fundamental character of the right to marry, we do not mean to 
suggest that every state regulation which relates in any way to the incidents of or 
prerequisites for marriage must be subjected to rigorous scrutiny. To the contrary, 
reasonable regulations that do not significantly interfere with decisions to enter into 
the marital relationship may legitimately be imposed.51 
Yet in the absence of a limiting principle to privacy, it is hard for the Court to 
explain why the privacy doctrine should not be applied with its usual severity 
in both areas, or indeed in many others. 
The lack of a definition of and limiting principles to the privacy doctrine 
puts pressure on state-interest analysis, since one obvious solution to the 
problem of a too-expansive privacy doctrine is to allow the state interests in 
such regulations to override the privacy right. For instance, one solution to 
·the uncertain dimensions of the rights of nonstandard right-bearers would be 
to acknowledge a state interest either in protecting the right-bearers (as with 
minors) or in protecting society against the right-bearers (as with prisoners). 
That solution, however, has been barred by the virtually outcome-
determinative nature of the question whether a fundamental right is at stake. 
That is, in the privacy context, the modern test has proved so strict that a 
47. Freund, Privacy, in PRIVACY (Nomos XIII) (J. Pennock &J. Chapman eds. 1971). 
48. See Schneider, supra note 3; Note, supra note 8. 
49. Roe v. Wade. 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973). 
50. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
51. 434 u.s. 384, 386 (1978). 
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statute that must meet it stands little chance of being found constitutional. 5 2 
The Court's slowness to adopt and reluctance to adhere to the modern test 
may, then, have been an attempt to preserve flexibility in handling the 
intricate and puzzling problems with which family law deals while retaining 
the two-tier test and its accompanying doctrinal tools.53 
The two-tier test has been much assailed by academics andjudges because 
of its rigidity, and in equal protection cases the Court has responded to the 
problem by adopting a third tier of intermediate scrutiny.54 I have tried to 
show how, in the privacy area, that rigidity indeed exists and indeed has 
driven the Court to doctrinal confusion and sub rosa adjustments of its 
standards. However, the two-tier approach has virtues, and its alternatives 
have faults. Its first virtue is that it is professedly an attempt to limit the 
damage done to the majoritarian principle by judicial review, since its purpose 
is to preserve a large area within which legislatures have the considerable 
liberty granted them by the rational-basis standard. The two-tiered 
approach's second virtue is that it promotes simplicity and predictability of 
decision. The primary alternative to the two-tiered approach, on the other 
hand, is to balance the right against the state interest case by case. Since 
personal rights and state interests are incommensurable, it is hard to see what 
52. Roe v. Wade was the only privacy case in which a state successfully asserted that its interests 
were compelling. When the Court has wished to uphold a regulation, it has generally done so by 
interpreting the right narrowly rather than finding that the state interest overcomes the right. In 
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977), for instance, the Court upheld a state regulation permitting 
Medicaid payments only for "medically necessary" abortions. The Court avoided applying the 
modem test by concluding "that the Connecticut regulation does not impinge upon the fundamental 
right recognized in Roe." !d. at 474. And, in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), the Court 
sustained a state law prohibiting homosexual sodomy. The Court avoided applying the modem test 
by interpreting the earlier privacy cases and concluding that those cases would not "extend a 
fundamental right to homosexuals to engage in acts of consensual sodomy." /d. at 192. For 
information about the larger background of these issues, see Professor Gunther's influential· 
discussion of the .two-tier problem in the context of equal protection. Gunther, supra note 8. 
53. The rigidity of substantive-due-process analysis contrasts illuminatingly with the 
comparative flexibility of procedural-due-process analysis. As we have seen, a finding that a statute 
conflicts with a substantive fundamental right generally means the statute will be held 
unconstitutional. In contrast, comparatively little need turn on the finding of a right to procedural 
due process: The Court has often interpreted the requirements of due process flexibly, in ways that 
are relatively sensitive both to the variety of personal interests at stake and to the different 
institutional contexts in which the state acts. Thus, instead of invariably requiring trial-like-
procedures, the Court has held, for example, that the ordinary admittance and retention procedures 
of a state mental hospital could provide due process to children involuntarily committed by their 
parents. Parham v.J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979). 
The standard criteria for evaluating due process issues make the flexibility of procedural-due-
process analysis plain, for in determining what process is due, the Court overtly weighs the private 
interests, the governmental interest, and the risk that the procedures in use will produce incorrect 
decisions. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 ( 1976). The flexibility of due process lies not only in 
the freedom it allows in shaping remedies to the nature of the right, but (somewhat less attractively) 
in the fact that it often allows courts to avoid making'hard decisions about the scope of the right. See 
Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816 (1977). Of course, the 
Court need not use this flexibility. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982). Similarly, one 
advantage (the virtue of its fault) of the Lochner era's formulation of the state-interest test (a 
"reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the state") was that it gave courts a 
flexibility that modem substantive-due-process law does not. 
54. See Shaman, Cracks in the Structure: The Coming Breakdown in the Levels of Scrutiny, 45 OHio ST. 
L.J. 161 (1984). 
Page 79: Winter 1988] CoNSTITUTIONALIZATION OF SociAL IssuEs 89 
principle would guide courts if balancing were substituted for two-tier 
analysis, and one supposes pressure would build to develop such a principle. 
Since commentators have not proffered a principle, one wonders how much 
of an improvement it might be. Furthermore, ad hoc balancing offers no 
institutionalized protection for the majoritarian principle, and for that matter, 
offers no institutionalized protection for the right to privacy.55 
In sum, then, we have seen in this part a Court struggling to find a 
standard to apply in state-interest analysis. We have seen that even when the 
Court articulated a standard, it could not bring itself to apply it consistently. 
We have seen that these problems derive from the inability of the Court to 
define the doctrine of privacy and to infer from the definition a limiting 
principle. The absence of such a principle puts considerable pressure on 
state-interest analysis to provide limits on the privacy doctrine. How well 
state-interest analysis responds will depend in part on the clarity and 
usefulness of the terms its test employs. To that subject we now turn. 
B. The Uncertain Meaning of the Standard's Terms 
I have been arguing that the first difficulty with the Supreme Court's state-
interest analysis has been its ambivalence in selecting a standard of review. 
The second difficulty is its unwillingness to define the standard's component 
terms. The first of these terms, of course, is that the legislation be 
"necessary" to serve the state interest. But what is necessary? How effective, 
for example, does the statute have to be? Effective as compared to what? As 
compared to the normal run of statutes, or as compared to some absolute 
standard? How is effectiveness to be measured? Given the state of the social 
sciences and the limits of social resources, can effectiveness be measured? 
Because "necessary" is undefined, questions of this sort could be multiplied 
indefinitely. In the absence of definitions, then, we must turn to the Court's 
holdings to construe the term's meaning. 
In privacy cases, the Court has largely handled questions of "necessity" 
not by directly assessing a statute's effectiveness, but rather by devising and 
deploying two categories of "non-necessity." In the first of these categories, 
the Court finds that a statute is not "necessary" because some alternative and 
constitutionally inoffensive statute would serve the state's purpose. In 
principle, this formula is appealing. In practice, there have been important 
unanswered questions. How far, for instance, does the state have to go to find 
alternatives? How is the effectiveness of the alternative to be judged? What if 
the alternative would cost substantially more, either economically or socially? 
What if it would work less well? What if its chances of success are purely 
55. Professor Gunther's solution, see supra note 8, is to allow for rational-basis scrutiny with 
bite, but to allow the court only to evaluate means, not ends. This solution has the virtue of relieving 
courts of the problem of comparing incommensurables and of providing some institutionalized 
protection for the majoritarian principle. However, courts would still be left with the difficulties of 
evaluating means which I will describe in part II.B. infra, and, since virtually every statute that has 
been invalidated on privacy grounds was invalidated on means and not ends grounds, his proposal 
might make little difference in privacy cases. 
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speculative? Because the Court does not examine alternatives with anything 
like the energy it devotes to challenged statutes, we are hard put to answer 
such questions. 
The difficulty with the "alternatives" principle in the privacy context has in 
part to do with a particular feature of family law: In it, enforcement problems 
are as pervasive and intractable as anywhere in the law. 56 The severity of 
these enforcement problems makes the availability of alternatives less 
meaningful and may make necessary the cumulative use of several kinds of 
enforcement measures. For example, in Zablocki 57 the Court said that "the 
State already has numerous other means for exacting compliance with 
support obligations, means, that are at least as effective as the instant statute's 
and yet do not impinge upon the right to marry."58 The Court listed wage 
assignments, civil contempt proceedings, and criminal penalties. 59 These 
alternatives were in fact part of Wisconsin's law, but they had been notably 
ineffective.60 Even the most vigorous, systematic, and successful states do 
badly at enforcing child-support obligations.61 Further, many statutes 
attempt to deal with several related social problems at once. A satisfactory 
alternative should presumably deal with all the problems the challenged 
statute dealt with. For instance, the alternatives to the Zablocki statute (wage 
assignments, civil contempt proceedings, and criminal penalties) all were 
aimed at men who could afford to pay but refused to; the Zablocki statute, on 
the other hand, tried in part to prevent men from becoming unable to pay 
their current child support because they had assumed new financial 
responsibilities and in part to prevent men from incurring new child-support 
56. For a brief summary of the multitude of reasons for this, see Schneider, The Next Step: 
Definition, Generalization, and Theory in American Family Law, 18 U. MICH.]. L. REF. 1039, 1056 (1985). 
57. For a description of Zablocki, see supra text accompanying note 24. 
58. 434 u.s. 374, 389 ( 1978). 
59. !d. at 390. The Court never asked whether, since the successful enforcement of the financial 
obligations (like alimony or child support) of one marriage would also presumably deter some 
people from taking on similar new obligations, these alternatives might also "impinge upon the right 
to marry." 
60. Ironically, the first major study of child-support enforcement policies investigated Dane 
County, Wisconsin (the county containing Madison, the state capital). Eckhardt, Social Change, 
Legal Controls, and Child Support: A Study in the Sociology of Law (Ph.D. diss., University of 
Wisconsin 1965). As Professor Chambers reports, 
Eckhardt found that in the first year under the support order, 40 percent of fathers made no 
payments whatever. By the seventh year, over 70 percent were making no payments. Over the 
seven-year period, the mean level of payments by all fathers seems to have been no higher than 
about 30 percent of everything they owed. 
D. CHAMBERS, MAKING FATHERS PAY 72 (1979). 
61. In Genesee County, Michigan, an unusually successful county in an unusually successful 
state (an administrative agency, the Friend of the Court, helps pursue delinquents, and courts use jail 
readily), 24% of the fathers who owed child support were paying 10% or less of the ordered amount 
in the sixth year of the order; 18% were paying between 10% and 80%; and 58% were paying 80% 
or more of the ordered payment. D. CHAMBERS, supra note 60, at 77. Using the world, not the 
United States, as the point of comparison, one scholar concludes that "even a very efficient support 
system has its limits . . . . About 15 percent of Swedish divorced parents liable for support pay 
nothing, while 25 percent pay less than 30 percent of what they owe." M. GLENDON, ABORTION AND 
DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAw: AMERICAN FAILURES, EUROPEAN CHALLENGES 88-89 (1987). 
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obligations which they could not meet.62 In short, alternatives are rarely 
likely to be fully satisfactory substitutes. Indeed, even the challenged 
statutory device and all the alternatives combined may often not fully achieve 
the legislative purpose (or, more often and more problematically, purposes). 
In. that sense, the challenged device may indeed be a necessary, if only 
incremental, step.63 
The Court's second (and related) category of "non-necessity" has to do 
with "fit" (with whether a legislative classification is over- or underinclusive). 
Fit, of course, is an idea used primarily in equal-protection analysis, where the 
absence of fit may indicate that one group has been singled out for special 
benefits or burdens. However, fit works awkwardly in fundamental-rights 
cases, even when, as in Eisenstadt and Zablocki, fundamental-rights analysis is 
clothed in the garb of equal protection. True, the "overinclusiveness" part of 
fit analysis may in principle be appropriate. A statute that infringes 
fundamental rights more broadly than is truly necessary to accomplish all the 
state's purposes surely is undesirable.64 But "underinclusiveness," while 
relevant to equal-protection analysis because it hints that a favored group is 
excusing itself from the burden of a statute, seems irrelevant to privacy cases. 
Consider, for example, the underinclusiveness argument in Zablocki. There, 
the Court noted that the statute "does not limit in any way new financial 
commitments by the applicant other than those ansmg out of the 
contemplated marriage."65 But why is this troublesome? Quite aside from 
the many reasons for singling out the costs arising out of a contemplated 
marriage,66 why is it a fault that the statute does not go as far in restricting 
62. It was presumably also aimed at compelling regular payment by divorced men who wished to 
remarry or to be free to do so. 
63. Zablocki reveals another problem with means analysis: the difficulty of measurement. Means 
analysis requires, in principle, that courts be able to decide whether a statute is effectively serving its 
purpose. But even under the best of circumstances, this inquiry will be brutally difficult. Suppose 
that a statutory prohibition is never violated. It will be impossible to say that the statute is successful 
because it will be impossible to say that the people would not have behaved as they were directed to 
even in the absence of a statute. Suppose, on the other hand, that a statutory prohibition is often 
violated. It will be impossible to measure the effect of the statute because there will be no way of 
knowing whether even more people would have behaved even more undesirably in the absence of a 
prohibitory statute. For example, a failure to punish the improper behavior might have encouraged 
improper behavior by allowing people to think that, because the behavior was not punished, it was 
not disapproved. These problems may be particularly acute in an area like Zablocki's, since a 
widespread sense that other ex-husbands are not keeping up their payments might lead men to ask, 
"Why should I pay if nobody else does?" To put the point differently, one important, but 
unmeasurable, function of a statute may be to reinforce the beliefs and behavior of those who are 
already acting properly. 
64. It is not clear that the "overinclusiveness" problem is different from the "alternatives" 
problem. Thus, the same limits to the "alternatives" approach I catalogued above may apply to 
"overinclusiveness" approaches. 
65. 434 u.s. 374, 390 (1978). 
6q. Costs arising out of a contemplated marriage might be singled out for special treatment 
because, for example, (I) they are likely to be specially great, (2) they are likely to be costs which last 
a particularly long time, (3) they are likely to be costs which cannot and ought not be escaped, and 
(4) they are costs that it is particularly easy for the state to regulate through its control over marriage 
licenses. Furthermore, the prohibition in Zablocki was presumably designed not just to protect the 
delinquent's existing children and former spouse, but to protect the delinquent's future children and 
future spouse. The regulation seems neatly tailored for that purpose, enforcement problems aside. 
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liberty as it might? What would a statute that was not underinclusive look 
like? Would it not be socially and perhaps constitutionally more offensive than 
the challenged statute?67 
Problems with using fit also arise when the Court assesses each of a 
statute's several purposes without considering the ways in which the 
legislature must moderate its pursuit of one goal in order to serve others as 
well. This is what Professor Nagel, in his incisive student note, calls the 
"divide and conquer" tactic.68 His analysis of Eisenstadt v. Baird illustrates this 
flaw in "fit" reasoning. The Massachusetts statute in Eisenstadt prohibited the 
distribution of contraceptives except for prophylactic purposes or except to 
married couples by prescription. The Court said that the statute was 
discriminatory and overbroad because, "'[i]f there is a need to have a 
physician prescribe . . . contraceptives, the need is as great for unmarried 
persons as for married persons.' "69 But, Professor Nagel observes, another 
purpose of the statute was to discourage premarital sex, which accounts for 
the different treatment of the married and unmarried. The Court noted 
further that some contraceptives were available if they could be used for 
prophylaxis. Professor Nagel responds that this was not evidence of the 
statute's insincerity, as the Court seemed to think, since the statute sought to 
restrict access to contraceptives only insofar as that was consistent with 
another statutory purpose-promoting public health. Finally, the Court held 
that the statute violated the equal protection clause because of the exception 
for married couples. Professor Nagel argues, however, that this exception was 
drawn in recognition (probably constitutionally required after Griswold v. 
Connecticut) of the right to marital privacy. In sum, Professor Nagel concludes 
that, by testing the statutory purposes in isolation from each other, the Court 
missed the complexity of the true statutory purpose and therefore could not 
properly evaluate whether the statute's means fit its ends: 
The legislature's overall purpose might have been defined as follows: to discourage 
premarital sex by making contraceptives harder to obtain to the extent that this would 
not increase the risks of venereal disease; to provide for the medical supervision of the 
distribution of contraceptives to the extent that this would not increase the availability 
of contraceptives to the unmarried; and to discourage the use of contraceptives to the 
extent that this would not interfere with the private behavior of married persons. 
Unless it is "irrational" per se for a legislature to design a statute to achieve a set of 
somewhat conflicting policy objectives, the Massachusetts statute would appear to 
have been rational. 70 
Having glimpsed some of the difficulties of defining "necessary," let us 
move now to the second undefined term in the Court's standard for deciding 
privacy cases-the requirement that statutes infringing privacy rights serve a 
67. The Court has used "fit" reasoning in similarly puzzling ways in other areas. See Schn,eider, 
Free Speech and Corporate Freedom: A Comment on First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 59 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1227, 1285-86 (1986). 
68. Note, Legislative Purpose, Rationality, and Equal Protection, 82 YALE L.J. 123, 127 (1972). 
69. 405 U.S. 438,450 (1972) (quoting Commonwealth v. Baird, 355 Mass. 746, 758,247 N.E.2d 
574, 581 (1969) (Whittemore & Cutter, JJ., dissenting)). 
70. Note, supra note 68, at 127-28. 
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"compelling state interest." What is "compelling"? The term has no intrinsic 
meaning. On the contrary, it is classically a term of imprecision in literary 
criticism, the term critics use when they liked the book, but can't quite figure 
out why. Yet the Court has sedulously avoided defining it. Of course, judges 
frequently leave the definition of a test to case law which gradually reveals and 
refines the test's meaning. However, since Roe v. Wade is the only privacy case 
that acknowledged a compelling state interest, we are left with the 
information that protecting a pregnant woman's health after the first trimester 
and protecting fetal life after the second trimester are compelling state 
interests. But since the Court barely explains why these are compelling state 
interests or why each interest is not compelling at an earlier stage of 
pregnancy,7 1 we are left with only a shallow understanding of "compelling" 
state interests. 
It might, of course, be thought that the kinds of statutes at issue in privacy 
cases are simply unlikely ever to implicate state interests of any significance, 
that they are mere attempts to "legislate morality. " 72 But that is not so. The 
purpose of the statute overridden in Zablocki, for instance, was in part to 
improve the often intolerable circumstances of divorced women and their 
children. Recent evidence suggests that, even where former husbands 
faithfully make alimony and child-support payments, former wives and their 
children are more severely disadvantaged economically by divorce than their 
former husbands. 73 And since those payments are widely not made, the 
state's interest in alleviating their misery is urgent. 74 In Roe v. Wade, to take an 
example of a different sort, it was not easy to understand why the scope of the 
"compelling" state interest was not even greater than the Court conceded. 
The Court there said that fetal life in the first two trimesters is "potential life." 
It did not explain why potential human life may not be of compelling interest 
71. The Court's explanations of when both interests become compelling may be given in their 
entirety: 
With respect to the State's important and legitimate interest in the health of the mother, the 
"compelling" point ... is at approximately the end of the first trimester. This is so because of 
the now-established medical fact ... that until the end of the first trimester mortality in abortion 
may be less than mortality in normal childbirth. 
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 ( 1973). Yet it is hard to see why that medical fact indicates that the 
state does not have an interest in preventing whatever mortality and whatever morbidity may occur in 
first trimester pregnancies. 
With respect to the State's important and legitimate interest in potential life, the "compelling" 
point is at viability. This is so because the fetus then presumably has the capability of 
meaningful life outside the mother's womb. 
/d. at 163. We are not told, however, what "meaningful" means or why fetal life before the third 
trimester-which the Court stipulates is at least "potential life"-may not be of compelling interest 
to the state. 
72. For a brief comment on whether "legislating morality" is a legitimate state interest, see infra 
note 93 and accompanying text. 
73. See generally D. CHAMBERS, supra note 60; L. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE 
UNEXPECTED SoCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQ.UENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA (1985); 
T. ARENDELL, MoTHERS AND DIVORCE: LEGAL, EcoNOMIC, AND SociAL DILEMMAS (1986). 
74. The Court in Zablocki, of course, did not say that these interests were not important; it did 
not reach that question, since it found the statute "unnecessary" to serve the state purpose. 434 U.S. 
at 388. 
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to a state (nor did it satisfactorily explain why a state could not reasonably 
conclude that it was protecting not just potential, but actual, human life). 
Since the law usually regards human life as the ultimate value, such an 
explanation seems called for. To take a final kind of example, in some privacy 
cases the state interest is to effectuate privacy rights that might otherwise be 
. destroyed. In Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 75 for instance, 
the Court held unconstitutional a statute that required minors to have 
parental consent to an abortion. The Court saw the requirement as the 
delegation of a state veto to the parents, and thus as unconstitutional. But the 
parents' interest in directing the upbringing and defining and ensuring the 
welfare of their children is itself a fundamental right and therefore, one might 
suppose, a compelling state interest. 76 
The ambiguities I have been discussing are aggravated by the uncertainty 
whether "compelling" is an absolute or a relative term. That is, may the 
strength of the state interest vary with the strength of the fundamental right, 
so that a weak fundamental right may be infringed by a weak compelling state 
interest? Similarly, is "necessary" an absolute term, or does it vary with the 
strength of the right or with the strength of the state interest? The language 
of the test suggests that these terms are not relative, that an interest is either 
compelling or it isn't, that a statute is either necessary to serve an interest or it 
isn't. Moreover, the Court has never avowedly treated "compelling" or 
"necessary" as relative terms, and when it has wished to uphold a statute, it 
has struggled to find that no fundamental right is affected and thus that the 
question whether the state's interest is compelling may be avoided, a struggle 
that might often be unnecessary were the test's terms relative. 77 Finally, 
making "necessary" and "compelling" absolute and not relative terms helps 
courts escape balancing the right against the state interest, a consumation 
devoutly to be wished, given that the two are incommensurable. 
Nevertheless, it is easy to think that, particularly in an area of regulation as 
intricate as family law, some exercises of a fundamental right will be trivial 
and ought to be regulable with only modest justification. This, indeed, is what 
the quotation from Zablocki (that not "every state regulation which relates in 
any way to the incidents of or prerequisites for marriage must be subjected to 
rigorous scrutiny") implies. 78 Further, the Court in Roe v. Wade seemed to be 
using just such a sliding scale in its scheme of increasing levels of permissible 
regulation in each succeeding trimester. Finally, cases involving minors and 
75. 428 u.s. 52, 72-75 (1976). 
76. On similar grounds, the Court in Danforth invalidated a spousal-consent provision. If such a 
provision is seen not as the delegation of state power but, as Justice White saw it in dissent, 428 U.S. 
at 93, as the state's recognition of the father's privacy right in making decisions about procreation, 
then, given the importance the Court has anributed to such rights, the state's interest seems 
compelling. This kind of state interest (that is, an interest in promoting the privacy rights of one 
among several competing individuals) is particularly likely to arise in cases involving conflicts 
between parents and children. E.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). I discuss the 
frequency of such conflicts and the dilemmas they represent in Schneider, supra note 3. 
77. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
78. 434 u.s. 374, 386 (1978). 
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prisoners can be understood as allowing heightened state regulation because 
of the relatively weak privacy rights involved. In short, there are reasonable 
arguments on both sides of the question whether "compelling" and 
"necessary" are relative terms, a fact which exacerbates the ambiguities I have 
been describing. 
These doubts about whether the terms of the test are relative or absolute 
go back once again to the Court's failure to define the privacy right. That 
right apparently encompasses widely various kinds of situations (from entry 
into marriage, to parental decisions about children's education, to abortion), 
and even within a single situation the nature and intensity of the personal 
interest can vary radically. If "necessary" and "compelling" are absolute 
terms, the Court must encounter the awkward problem of dealing with 
fundamental rights that protect both vital and trivial personal interests. In 
contrast, consider equal protection cases involving race. The country's 
historical experience with racial discrimination, the harshness of the need to 
repudiate that experience, and the cruel injury racial discrimination inflicts 
provide some common level of seriousness to equal protection rights. That 
commonality makes it plausible to require a compelling state interest 
whenever a statute infringes the equal protection rights of a racial minority. 
The absence of any such commonality makes that standard awkward in privacy 
cases when relatively modest interests are defended with the full arsenal of a 
fundamental right. • 
In sum, state-interest analysis in fourteenth amendment privacy cases has 
been marked by repeated failures of definition, by failures to define either a 
standard or its component terms. These failures bespeak, I think, the Court's 
unwillingness or inability to decide what it meant to do when it began to 
constitutionalize family law, the difficulties of setting coherent yet reasonably 
simple and workable judicial policy in an area as multifarious as family law and 
in a country as various as ours, and the problems with assessing the 
desirability and effectiveness of legislation in family law. At the last of these, 
we now take a closer look. 
C. The Uncertain Handling of Empirical Evidence 
I observed above that the absence of a limiting principle to the right to 
privacy puts pressure on state-interest analysis, which takes on most of the 
burden of limiting that right. Our study of the terms of the Court's test for 
evaluating state interests concluded, however, that state-interest analysis as 
the court developed it is ill-equipped to sustain that pressure. Thus, the 
weakness of state-interest analysis in turn puts pressure on the definition of 
the fundamental right. Nevertheless, if the Court's handling of each case were 
probing and perceptive, these reciprocal pressures might be somewhat 
alleviated. The Court's performance, however, has generally been clumsy and 
obtuse. My criticisms here have particularly to do with the Court's treatment 
of empirical problems. Showing that a statute isn't "necessary" to promote 
the legislature's purpose raises empirical questions of the most elaborate and 
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perplexing kind. Yet the Court consistently prefers a priori reasoning to 
marshalling and analyzing empirical evidence. I believe this problem is 
important, but since I have explored the Court's aversion to empirical 
evidence elsewhere,79 I will not expatiate on it here. 
There are, of course, many reasons for the Court's perfunctory and 
dismissive treatment of empirical issues. The most sympathetic is that social 
scientists often have not studied a problem, or have not studied it in ways that 
speak to the policy issues courts confront. Another sympathetic reason is that 
the issues are so complex and impenetrable that even skillful studies 
commonly produce tentative, partial, and unhelpful results. 8° Further, 
lawyers often fail to adduce what social science evidence there is, and courts 
are generally unequipped to use it well.81 But courts also are crippled by what 
I have called their hyper-rationalism-"the belief that reason can reliably be 
used to infer facts where evidence is unavailable or incomplete."82 More 
specifically: 
In its first aspect, [hyper-rationalism] is the assumption that systematic evidence is 
generally superfluous to understanding social problems, since the behavior of people 
and institutions can be logically inferred from a general understanding of how people 
and institutions work. In its second aspect, it is the assumption that, in the absence of 
a general understanding of how people and institutions work, anecdotal evidence is 
generally sufficient, since the behavior of people and institutions can be logically 
inferred from a few examples of their actual behavior under the relevant 
circumstances. In its third aspect, it is the assumption that a description of social 
reality articulated in one case may be taken as demonstrated fact in subsequent cases; 
it is, in other words, the application of stare decisis to evidence about social behavior.83 
In sum, the reciprocal pressure that a poorly defined privacy right and a 
poorly constructed state-interest analysis place on each other is exacerbated 
by the Court's regularly superficial and inept treatment of empirical 
problems. But to have concluded that the doctrinal structure of state-interest 
analysis is infirm leaves unremarked several further doctrinal weaknesses and 
a number of considerations that go beyond doctrine. To these and to their 
consequences for the constitutionalization of social issues we now turn. 
79. Schneider, Lawyers and Children: Wisdom and Legitimacy in Family Policy, 84 MICH. L. REv. 919 
(1986). 
80. For two excellent reviews of the social science literature on issues relating to child-custody 
decisions, both reaching this kind of conclusion about the literature, see Ellsworth & Levy, Legislative 
Reform of Child Custody Adjudication: An Effort to Rely on Social Science Data in Formulating Legal Policies, 4 
LAw & Soc'v REv. 167 (1969); Chambers, Rethinking the Rules for Custody Disputes in Divorce, 83 MICH. 
L. REv. 477 (1984). For an extended and thoughtful examination of the problems involved in 
designing and carrying out social science research intended to answer policy questions, seeM. WALD, 
j. CARLSMrrH & P. LEIDERMAN, PROTECTING ABUSED AND NEGLECTED CHILDREN (1988). 
81. See Davis, "There is a Book Out . .. ": An Analysis of judicial Absorption of Legislative Facts, 100 
HARV. L. REV. 1539 (1987). 
82. Schneider, supra note 79, at 932. 
83. /d. at 932-33 (footnotes omitted). For a detailed and telling examination of how courts have 
dealt with empirical problems in various kinds of fourteenth amendment cases involving children, 
seeR. MNOOKIN, R. BuRT, D. CHAMBERS, M. WALD, S. SuGARMAN, F. ZIMRING & R. SoLOMON, IN THE 
INTEREST OF CHILDREN (1985}, particularly part IV, which contains Professor Mnookin's incisive 
analysis of the judicial treatment of the policy issues in Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 ( 1976). For an 
insightful and broader examination of rationalism in constitutional analysis, see Nagel, Rationalism in 
Constitutional Law, 4 CoNST. COMMENT 9 (1987). 
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III 
A DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVE ON STATE INTERESTS: 
THE SOCIALIZING STRATEGY 
In part II, I made three criticisms of the Court's state-interest analysis. 
These criticisms seem to me important not just on their own merits, but 
because each of them reflects serious difficulties with the principle of 
fourteenth amendment privacy. I now wish to investigate some of those 
difficulties from a different perspective by exploring more generally the kinds 
of justifications a state may legitimately advance in support of a statute said to 
violate a fourteenth amendment privacy right. My discussion begins with the 
general observation that the Court often looks at the particular situation a 
case presents in isolation from its legal and social context and often looks at 
the challenged statute in isolation from other statutes and from other forms of 
social regulation. Seen in these two, related, kinds of isolation, many of these 
statutes seem to serve weak, to say nothing of compelling, interests. Seen in 
these kinds of isolation, many of these statutes appear under- or over-
inclusive. But seeing these statutes in isolation is troublesome, for reasons 
that repay extended inquiry. 
Let me illustrate the first kind of isolation-the isolation of the particular 
fact situation from its larger social setting-with a case from the Colorado 
Supreme Court. In Israel v. Allen, 84 a brother and sister related only by 
adoption and not by blood wished to marry. Colorado law expressly forbad 
such marriages. The court's opinion began, "Since we find ... that the 
provision prohibiting marriage between adopted children fails even to satisfy 
minimum rationality requirements, we need not determine whether a 
fundamental right is infringed by this statute."85 The state had reasoned that 
the statute furthered an interest in "family harmony," but the court replied 
that, because there were no special genetic risks to such a marriage and 
because the " 'natural repugnance of people toward marriages of blood 
relatives ... is quite generally lacking in application to the union of those 
related only by affinity,' " there could be no logical reason for barring this 
couple from marriage.86 The court therefore ruled in favor of the brother and 
sister. 
The Israel's "family harmony" may indeed have been undisturbed, but 
surely the state's argument was not addressed just to that particular family. 
Rather, the state presumably meant that "family harmony" in society 
generally was promoted by keeping the possibility of sexual relations between 
family members as far from their minds as possible . .S7 In brief, the legislature 
sought to reinforce the incest taboo. It sought to do so by making marriage 
84. 195 Colo. 263, 577 P.2d 763 (Colo. 1978). 
85. !d. at 265, 577 P.2d at 764. 
86. /d. at 764 (quoting I VERNIER, AMERICAN fAMILY LAws 183 (1931)). 
87. When one of my classes was discussing Israel, a student said (in a voice rich with discovery), 
"If I'd known brothers and sisters married each other, I would have looked at my brother in a whole 
different way." 
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between any people in the relation of siblings entirely unthinkable, not just 
unthinkable for actual siblings. Taboos do not work rationally; they work by 
inducing reactions of horror and disgust at the prohibited practice. Rational 
analysis of taboos is not only likely to miss this point, but even itself to weaken 
the taboo. Once you begin to think about which kinds of incest-like activities 
lack particular identifiable harmful consequences for particular identifiable 
participants, you begin to think about the unthinkable and about why some 
"incest" is harmless incest. As this process continues, the emotional force of 
the taboo, its force as a general deterrent, is eroded. Thus, by failing to 
understand that the statutory prohibition was part of a larger social 
prohibition which served a larger social purpose than preventing the 
disruption of particular families, the court misunderstood the nature and 
mechanics of the state's interest and underestimated its strength (and its 
ultimate rationality). 88 
The second (and related) kind of isolation in which courts tend to see 
statutes-the isolation of statutes from their larger legal context-may be 
introduced by a more troublesome case, one in which the state's position 
seems merely anachronistic and the Court's position seems at least stronger 
than the court's in Israel. In Eisenstadt v. Baird, the Court confronted a 
Massachusetts statute prohibiting the distribution (not, as in Griswold, the use) 
of contraceptives. In considering the statute's justifications, the Court quoted 
a 1917 opinion of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court which said that 
the law's " 'plain purpose is to protect purity, to preserve chastity, to 
encourage continence and self restraint, to defend the sanctity of the home, 
and thus to engender in the State and nation a virile and virtuous race of men 
and women.' " 89 The Court responded to this quaint avowal by noting that 
the statute allowed married couples access to contraceptives and by reasoning 
that Massachusetts could not have intended to make pregnancy a punishment 
for the mere misdemeanor of fornication. The Court thus found the statute 
unconstitutional. This was, no doubt, an uncommonly silly law.90 
Nevertheless, the Court unduly limited its understanding of the state interest 
by seeing the statute in isolation. 
The problem Eisenstadt illustrates is that a statute may be intended as part 
of a system oflegal (and non-legal) regulation of social behavior. Family law, as 
I noted above, is distinguished by the ubiquity and intensity of its 
enforcement difficulties. Because family law regulates conduct that occurs in 
private, because regulating private conduct can produce undesired and 
undetectable consequences, and because familial conduct is often motivated 
by fiercely powerful drives, family law-traditionally and presently-operates 
88. My argument is not intended to be dispositive of Israel. The remaining question is whether 
Martin and Tammy Israel should have to bear the (for them disproportionate) cost of maintaining 
the incest taboo. 
89. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 448 (1972) (quoting Commonwealth v. Allison, 227 Mass. 
57, 62, 116 N.E. 265, 266 (1917)). 
90. Justice Stewart wrote this of the statute in his dissent to Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 
479, 527 (1965). 
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argument could be made.93 Rather, the argument is that, by reinforcing a 
constraining system of morality, these statutes may serve two state interests, 
one clearly legitimate and one possibly legitimate.94 First, these statutes may 
help deter destructive behavior within families and regarding sexual behavior. 
They may, that is, help deter behavior that is specifically and uncontroversially 
criminal but hard to prevent and hard to heal-most significantly, rape, child 
abuse, and spouse abuse. They may also help deter legal but deleterious 
behavior-the injuries to spouses and children often associated with divorce 
are an example. 
The second, more problematic, justification of these statutes is that they 
may inhibit the growth of what might be called an offensive social 
environment. This justification assumes (controversially) that there is a 
legitimate state interest in resisting such an environment. This assumption 
finds its authority in law in Paris Adult Theatre I. v. Slaton, 95 in which the Court 
held "that there are legitimate state interests at stake in stemming the tide of 
commercialized obscenity . . . . [The rights and interests involved] include the 
interest of the public in the quality of life and the total community 
environment ... " 96 The ordinary response to this justification, of course, is 
that the prevention of offense cannot justify a statute that infringes any 
significant personal interest, since offense is a relatively slight injury and 
since, to avoid being offended, one need only turn one's head. Nevertheless, 
the offensive-environment argument should not be rejected out of hand. For 
in this respect, too, statutes ought not to be treated in isolation. A certain 
amount of offense must undoubtedly be socially tolerated, if only because of 
the enforcement problem. But, while any single offense, and even any 
particular kind of offense, may be tolerable, some kinds of offense may be 
cumulatively intolerable. Furthermore, offense may domesticate itself, 
creating a slippery slope-as we become accustomed to one kind of offense, 
the next kind comes to seem more tolerable. Eventually, we find ourselves 
tolerating what ought to be intolerable.97 
93. The Court has not decided whether preserving a system of morals is a compelling state 
interest, and one might suppose that the Court's failure to adduce that argument in, for example, Roe 
v. Wade implies that that argument would fail. In Bowers v. Hardwick, however, the Court, after 
deciding that no fundamental rights were at stake, considered the rational-basis argument that the 
state's sodomy statute was justified only (and thus inadequately) by "the presumed belief of a 
majority of the electorate in Georgia that homosexual sodomy is immoral and unacceptable." 478 
U.S. at 196 (1986). The Court denied that this belief provided an insufficient basis for the law: "The 
law ... is constantly based on notions of morality, and if all laws representing essentially moral 
choices are to be invalidated under the Due Process Clause, the courts will be very busy indeed." !d. 
94. Let us put aside the umesolvable question of whether they are "compelling" interests. 
95. 413 U.S. 49 (1973). 
96. !d. at 57-58. 
97. for a thoughtful discussion of this point, see G. CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATIITUDES, AND 
THE LAw: PRIVATE LAw PERSPECTIVES ON A PUBLIC LAw PROBLEM 69-86 ( 1985). See also Schneider, 
supra note 3, at part V. 
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IV 
THE SociALIZING STRATEGY AND THE CoNSTITUTIONALIZATION 
oF SociAL IssuEs 
A. Assessing the Socializing Strategy: The Pessimistic View 
of Human Nature 
101 
I have been intimating that if we look at some criticisms of ordinary state-
interest analysis, we can discern in the socializing strategy the shape of a 
broader view of the permissible scope of the state's interest in legislation 
subject to a privacy-rights attack. But is that view at all convincing? Do these 
statutes socialize? Will people behave badly if not nurtured in a culture of 
constraint, or is it the culture of constraint itself that nurtures bad behavior? 
Will a culture of constraint improve behavior enough to justify its undoubted 
costs? Will a set of specific statutes of the kind we are discussing contribute 
significantly to a culture of constraint? 
These questions are all,. I suppose, empirical questions. But they are 
empirical questions which we cannot answer now and which we are unlikely to 
answer soon. Little of the necessary empirical work has been done;98 nor is it 
likely to be illuminating when it is done: The empirical evidence will differ 
from place to place and time to time. It is absurdly difficult to design studies 
that measure the effects even of direct penalties for specific behavior, as the 
history of research on deterrence shows. It would be yet more difficult to 
isolate and test the effects on a whole category of behavior of a whole system 
of legal and social regulation. These and many other problems with 
conducting empirical research must cripple attempts to evaluate the 
soundness of the socializing strategy. Because we lack empirical evidence we 
must fall back on assumptions and principles. We are driven, that is, to 
confront a problem crucial to many family law issues but rarely discussed 
directly-the question of what human nature is. When questions about the 
98. As Professor Melton comments, 
One of the most curious remaining gaps has been in the effect of law on behavior. This general 
topic should be a natural for psycholegal study, in that perhaps the most obvious and pervasive 
psychological assumption in the law is that the law is effective in controlling behavior. ... 
However, social scientists, especially psychologists, have given very little attention to the 
significance of law in everyday experience and behavior. 
Melton, Introduction: The Law and Motivation, in THE LAw AS A BEHAVIORAL INSTRUMENT at xiii (G. 
Melton ed. 1986). Professor Melton notes that research has been especially scanty in an area that 
particularly interests us: "[T]he most important effects of law may be symbolic, and social scientists 
have been late to recognize the functions of the law that are not directly instrumental or utilitarian." 
!d. at xvii (emphasis in original). There are occasional hints in the literature that the law can 
influence social behavior even where fear of punishment is slight. Professor Bonnie reports, for 
instance, that "mandatory seat-belt laws represent a convincing illustration of the declarative effect of 
a legal prohibition .... We know that 40% of the driving population who did not wear seat belts 
before [a law requiring seat-belt use) was passed, and were not persuaded by educational efforts, 
began to do so in immediate response to the law." Bonnie, The Efficacy of Law as a Paternalistic 
Instrument, in THE LAw AS A BEHAVIORAL INSTRUMENT 131, 185 (G. Melton ed. 1986) (emphasis in 
original). For a sympathetic account of the law as an instrument of socialization and social structure, 
see Melton & Saks, The Law as an Instrument of Socialization and Social Structure, in THE LAw AS A 
BEHAVIORAL INSTRUMENT 235 (G. Melton ed. 1986). 
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socializing strategy are seen in that light, they begin to seem less exclusively 
empirical. They begin, rather, to implicate life's imponderables. 
How should a court respond to legislation that rests on a view of human 
nature which, like all such basic views, is not in any useful sense susceptible of 
proof? This question-which is in some ways subsidiary to the general 
problem of legislating in circumstances of empirical uncertainty-can be 
approached in many different ways. The Court addressed the question most 
relevantly to our purposes in an obscenity case, Paris Adult Theatre I. v. Slaton: 
It is not for us to resolve empirical uncertainties underlying state legislation, save in 
the exceptional case where that legislation plainly impinges upon rights protected by 
the Constitution itself . . . Although there is no conclusive proof of a connection 
between antisocial behavior and obscene material, the legislature of Georgia could 
quite reasonably determine that such a connection does or might exist. In deciding 
Roth, this Court implicitly accepted that a legislature could legitimately act on such a 
conclusion to protect "the social interest in order and morality" .... 99 
How aptly this quotation fits our cases and what consequences it should have 
for them are not fully clear. However, two standard arguments about the role 
of courts speak to their capacity to review statutes that rest on legislative 
conclusions about human nature: first, that courts are less suited than 
legislatures to acquire and assess evidence about legislative facts; second, that 
in a democracy, legislatures speak with more authority than courts because 
legislatures are intended to represent the people and courts are not. In the 
ordinary case, these two arguments yield a strong presumption that a statute 
is adequately founded in empirical reality and social theory; in any case they 
merit respect, particularly where the state's interests are pressing yet difficult 
to serve. However, the cases we are discussing here involve privacy rights 
which are arguably of special constitutional importance and which thus may 
arguably not be infringed on the basis of insubstantial theories. Therefore, it 
may be reasonable to say that, when deciding whether to impinge on a 
fundamental privacy right, a legislature may not be judicially prevented from 
consulting a theory like a theory of human nature at least where the theory has 
been substantially relied on in the past and where it has substantial 
intellectual antecedents. 100 
99. 413 U.S. 49, 60-61 (1973) (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1956)) 
(emphasis in original). The Court spoke to a somewhat different aspect of this issue in Carey v. 
Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 695 ( 1977), where it noted the absence of evidence that the 
statute served the state's purpose and the presence of evidence that it did not. Then, however, the 
Court announced that "the studies cited by appellees play no part in our decision. It is enough that 
we again confirm the principle that when a State, as here, burdens the exercise of a fundamental 
right, its attempt to justify that burden as a rational means for the accomplishment of some 
significant state policy requires more than a bare assertion, based on a conceded complete absence of 
supporting evidence, that the burden is connected to such a policy." /d. at 696. 
100. In ascertaining whether there is a fundamental right of some kind, the Court has long 
consulted historical practice. The standard I propose here may be seen as applying that same 
principle to the state-interest issue. As Justice Harlan wrote, 
The best that can be said is that through the course of this Court's decisions [substantive due 
process] has represented the balance which our Nation, built upon postulates of respect for the 
liberty of the individual, has struck between that liberty and the demands of organized 
society. . . . The balance of which I speak is the balance struck by this country, having regard to 
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Before we apply this test to our present problem, let me make two 
comments. First, we should recall that all schemes of statutory regulation are 
ultimately based on unprovable assumptions about human nature. Given this 
fact, given the significance of many of the social goals which can be at stake in 
privacy lit.igation, and given the desirability of permitting new ideas about 
human nature to become the basis for legislation and of allowing citizens in a 
democracy to legislate on the basis of their deepest beliefs about human 
nature, I believe that the test I have proposed is; if anything, too restrictive. 
However, I use it here because I think it provides the hardest reasonable test 
for the pessimistic view. My second comment is to emphasize that I will be 
discussing the proper scope of judicial review, not the preferable course of 
social policy. Thus, the discussion which follows asks whether a legislature 
may rely on a particular view of human nature, not whether a legislature 
should do so. 
The view of human nature on which these statutes seem to rely I will call-
for want of a better term-the pessimistic view. Let me now define it 
somewhat more fully, if abstractly and ahistorically. The pessimistic view is 
not the product of any one tradition, but appears in various forms in many 
traditions. It may see man's nature as evil; it at least believes man is easily led 
to harm himself and other people by his own self-interestedness. The 
pessimistic view is not necessarily hostile to the pleasures of the senses, 
though it can be. 101 It does, however, appreciate the power of those pleasures 
and recognizes that they can divert men from better ends and drive men 
toward worse ones. It therefore contrives to channel those pleasures into the 
service of good, as when it summons sexual passion to exalt love in marriage. 
Insofar as man's distracting or destructive propensities cannot be channelled 
into good, this view of human nature hopes to curb those propensities by 
social conditioning which seeks to internalize self-restraint. 
The pessimistic view of human nature-although crudely sketched here-
meets the two criteria I have proposed courts should use in reviewing 
legislation that rests on empirically unprovable theories. First, it sails past the 
historical-practice test. It is, to begin with, consonant with the attitude that 
informed the relevant texts of the Constitution itself. As Rogers Smith writes, 
The liberalism of the Framers ... did not view the end of the state as the equal 
protection of the right of each to think and do as he wished. Early liberals ... were 
confident that they could identify the activities and beliefs reason permitted and 
sometimes required, and that they could then draw lines distinguishing "liberty," 
which encompassed such rational activities and beliefs, from "license," the 
expressions of man's baser desires and passions. 
what history teaches are the traditions from which it developed as well as the traditions from 
which it broke. 
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan,]., dissenting). 
101. For arguments that Puritanism, American Christianity, and Victorianism were less hostile to 
those pleasures than is conventionally assumed, see, respectively, E. LEITES, THE PuRITAN 
CoNSCIENCE AND MODERN SEXUALITY (1986); P. GARDELLA, INNOCENT ECSTASY: How CHRISTIANITY 
GAVE AMERICA AN ETHIC OF SEXUAL PLEASURE (1985); P. GAY, EDUCATION OF THE SENSES (1984). 
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... The claim that true liberty requires the rule of reason over the passions was a 
chief characteristic of the "moderate Enlightenment" liberalism embodied in the 
Constitution .... 
. . . [U]Itimately, for the liberal intellectuals at least, the pleasures of the mind, the 
delights of wisdom and moral virtue, were still seen as higher than those of the body, 
and it was such rational perfection that men should seek most of all. 102 
In addition, the pessimistic view of human nature was historically a 
commonplace basis in America for law specifically and the regulation of social 
behavior generally. Such a view of human nature expressly underlay the 
colonial approach to family law and implicitly undergirded family law 
throughout the nineteenth century. Late eighteenth-century law (the law of 
the Constitution's era) regulated the family intensively and intrusively and 
embodied precisely many of the prohibitions now challenged on privacy 
grounds, including the prohibitions of fornication, cohabitation, adultery, 
abortion, 103 sodomy, and incest, to say nothing of the virtual prohibition of 
divorce. Late nineteenth-century law (the law of the fourteenth amendment's 
era) preserved those prohibitions and added new ones, including the 
Comstock laws (regulating contraceptives), whose invalidation has been so 
central in the development of the privacy doctrine. In sum, because the 
pessimistic view has been the dominant view at least through most of our 
history and has been effectively attacked as a basis for legislation only in 
recent decades, the historical-credentials test is safely met. 104 
The intellectual-credentials test is perhaps more problematic than the 
historical-antecedents test, because the pessimistic view of human nature has 
gradually lost the allegiance of many modern intellectuals. Nevertheless, that 
view is so much a part of three powerful intellectual traditions that the second 
test is satisfied as well. 
The first of these traditions is Christianity. 105 Rich and robust currents in 
both Catholicism and Protestantism have held that man is naturally sinful, that 
sin particularly manifests itself in family and sexual life, and that this human 
tendency must be constrained through an elaborate system of inhibitions, 
proscriptions, and renunciations. Although those currents may have flowed 
most profusely from St. Augustine and John Calvin, they flow freely even 
today. 106 And while the Christian version of this understanding of human 
nature has been the one most influential in American history, its ascetic 
102. Smith, The Constitution and Autonomy, 60 TEx. L. REv. 175, 177-78 (1982) (footnotes omitted). 
103. Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transformation of American Family Law, 83 MicH. L. REv. 
1803, 1869 (1985). 
104. See generally Schneider, supra note 103. 
105. I am not, of course, arguing here that it is legitimate to enact specifically religious doctrine 
into law. Rather, I am arguing that the pessimistic view of human nature can less readily be 
dismissed by a court if it has been taken seriously by any of the strong, mainstream intellectual 
traditions in American life, of which Christianity is surely one. In thinking about the extent to which 
ideas with religious roots may be used in making policy, I have benefitted from Greenawall, Religious 
Convictions and Lawmaking, 84 MICH. L. REv. 352 (1985). I commend that article to the reader, 
although I do not subscribe to all its arguments. 
106. SeeS. LYMAN, THE SEVEN DEADLY SINs: SociETY AND EviL 53-86 (1978). 
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aspects find their equivalents in many of the world's major religions and in 
significant aspects of classical philosophy. 
The second tradition supplying intellectual weight to the pessimistic view 
of human nature is psychology. Psychology is obviously a two-edged sword, 
because it is also a leading contributor to the opposite and now potent view of 
human nature and to a corresponding view of social policy that calls for 
relaxing social constraints. Yet for just this reason we need to recall 
psychology's darker strain. Men, Freud tells us in a chilling passage from 
Civilization and its Discontents, 
are not gentle creatures who want to be loved ... ; they are, on the contrary, creatures 
among whose instinctual endowments is to be reckoned a powerful share of 
aggressiveness. As a result, their neighbour is for them not only a potential helper or 
sexual object, but also someone who tempts them to satisfy their aggressiveness on 
him ... , to use him sexually without his consent ... , to humiliate him ... , to torture 
and to kill him. Homo homini lupus. [Man to man is a wolf.] 
Civilization [therefore] has to use its utmost efforts in order to set limits to man's 
aggressive instincts and to hold the manifestations of them in check by psychical 
reaction-formation. 107 
The third of the traditions is sociology. As Professor Grey observes, 
"[E]very thinker of the great central tradition of the last century's social 
thought has seen repressed sexuality and the authoritarian family structure as 
close to the core of our civilization. Conservative theorists have defended 
repression as necessary; revolutionaries have urged that society would have to 
be overthrown to free us from its tyranny." 108 A classic statement of this view 
is, of course, Max Weber's The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, which 
attributes the rise of the capitalist ethos to an unquenchable religious 
asceticism: 
Combined with the harsh doctrines of the absolute transcendality of God and the 
corruption of everything pertaining to the flesh, this inner isolation of the individual 
[caused by turmoil induced by the doctrine of predestination] contains ... the reason 
for the entirely negative attitude of Puritanism to all the sensuous and emotional 
elements in culture and in religion, because they are of no use toward salvation 
109 
As capitalism developed, some of the religious elements of that asceticism 
faded, but there remained a "rational asceticism" which condemned 
impulsive enjoyment of life as leading "away both from work in a calling and 
from religion." 110 More generally, sociologists have been absorbed by the 
problem of how society constrains and channels the disruptive force of 
l0i. S. FREUD, CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 58-59 (1930). See generally P. RIEFF, FREUD: 
THE MIND OF THE MORALIST (1959); P. RIEFF, THE TRIUMPH OF THE THERAPEUTIC ( 1966). For an 
intriguing criticism of modern psychology and psychiatry for being "more hostile to the inhibitory 
messages of traditional religious moralizing than is scientifically justified," see Campbell, On the 
Conflicts Between Biological and Social Evolution and Between Psychology and Moral Tradition, 1975 AM. 
PsvcHOLOCIST 1103, 1103. 
108. Grey, supra note 45. at 92. 
109. M. WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 105 (T. Parsons trans. 
1958). 
110. /d. at 167. 
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passion. 111 Indeed, Stanford Lyman argues that the social sciences 
themselves have "sought to control lust by splitting its facets into those that 
seemed worthy of support, such as love, rationality, affection, companionship, 
and those that crippled the social order, such as romantic illusions, erotic 
escapades, and sexual practices deemed deviant." 112 
As these brief allusions suggest, then, the pessimistic view of human 
nature and a reliance on systems for internalizing control of human behavior 
(particularly in family and sexual life) have roots that range deep and wide in 
our national experience and in Western thought. What is more, the 
pessimistic view still has many adherents, even if they are now less influential 
than they once were. And faith in these socializing techniques persists today: 
both sides of the political spectrum advocate them in practice, if not in 
principle. The right's faith in them is well known; the left's is less 
acknowledged, but is apparent in, for instance, feminist arguments for 
regulating pornography 113 and curbing spouse abuse and in liberal arguments 
for governmentally attacking racial and gender attitudes and stereotypes. Nor 
is the choice between the pessimistic view and its opposite necessarily a choice 
between social control and no social control. On the contrary, many social 
critics describe a new set of ideals and institutions which speak the softer 
language of therapy but which constrain as firmly as the old ideals and 
institutions. 114 
Ill. See S. LYMAN, supra note I 06, at 87 -I 02; Goode, The Theoretical Importance of Love, 24 AM. Soc. 
REV. 38 (1959). 
112. S. LYMAN, supra note 106, at 108. 
Professor Grey has a more extended yet still concise description of the pessimistic view (or at 
least of the particularly sexual aspects of the view), which he describes as "a view that has been 
central to modern thought and far more widely accepted in our time than contemporary versions of 
the liberalism of john Stuart Mill." Grey, supra note 45, at 83, 91. Professor Grey points out as well 
that "the Marxist enemies of bourgeois society have preached a similar message from a different 
perspective." !d. at 94. Indeed, he goes further than I would be willing to in saying that there are 
few spokesmen for the contrary view (which, in his understanding, "would ascribe to sexuality a 
considerable importance in the lives of individuals ... and ... would hold that the way sexual 
relations are carried on, at least among consenting adults, has no great effect on the welfare of 
society outside the sexual sphere." /d. at 94). He puts Bertrand Russell squarely in this camp, finds 
"something of the same spirit" in Michel Foucault, and concludes by adding Norman 0. Brown to 
the list. Professor Grey may be right that this view has few spokesmen, although I doubt they are as 
few as he seems to suggest. See, e.g., P. RoBINSON, THE MoDERNIZATION OF SEx (1976). In any event, 
the opposite of the pessimistic view should, I suppose, be the optimistic view. It would hold, 
essentially, that human nature is basically benign and that social constraint and social injustice are 
what cause harmful behavior, or at least inhibit good behavior. That view is widely popular in society 
generally. (For a description of this attitude's American roots, see Lears, From Salvation to Self-
Realization: Advertising and the ·Therapeutic Roots of the Consumer Culturt', /880-1930, in THE CuLTURE OF 
CONSUMPTION: CRITICAL ESSAYS IN AMERICAN HISTORY, 1880-1980, at l (R. Fox & T. Lears eds. 
1983)). That view may be prepotent in American family law. See Schneider, supra note 103. 
113. See Brest & Vandenberg, Politics, Feminism, and the Constitution: The Anti-Ponwgraphy Movement 
in l'vlinneapolis. 39 STAN. L. REv. 607 (1987). 
114. Among many examples is C. LASCH, HAVEN IN A HEARTLESS WORLD (1977). See also de 
Swaan, The Politics of Agorphobia, 10 THEORY & Soc'y 359 (1981). 
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B. Asses·sing the Socializing Strategy: The Political and Social Context 
At this point, one might concede the pessimistic view of human nature and 
the socializing strategy which acts on it, and yet insist that, at least as to 
"privacy" issues, such a strategy would not work in the United States today. 
The argument would be that a socializing strategy relies on some degree of 
social consensus and that any degree of consensus about family law issues has 
evaporated. The argument would continue that the socializing strategy relies 
on an understanding and acceptance of the ascetic view but that that 
understanding and acceptance are no longer common. There is surely much 
to that argument. How should a court considering a constitutional privacy 
challenge to a "socializing" statute deal with it? This is not the place for a 
full-dress review of that question, for it raises an elaborate set of empirical 
problems. I will, however, make three observations about the present 
American situation and then draw a conclusion from them. 
First, I suspect that our idea of the extent and permanence of dissensus 
generally, and of dissent from the ascetic view particularly, is skewed by the 
unexamined assumption that change in social behavior (particularly change in 
family law matters) is unidirectional-that change will always liberalize social 
rules. Historically, however, this has not been true. For instance, constraints 
on family and sexual behavior tightened markedly between the Elizabethan 
sixteenth century and the Puritan seventeenth century and between the 
Regency eighteenth century and the Victorian nineteenth century. 115 As 
those two examples suggest, social change is not unidirectional for two 
significant reasons. First, its causes are too various and numerous for social 
change to proceed uniformly, as the sudden appearance of AIDS and the 
social response to it ought to remind us. Second, social change of this kind is 
not uncontrollable; it is in part produced by manipulation of social policy. 
Throughout history groups have reacted, sometimes quite successfully, 
against what they perceived as inadequately constrained social behavior. Such 
reactions are in fact occurring today, and not just among the religious right. 
In any event, as a matter of social policy, it ought to be possible 
deliberately to adjust social rules as their effects become evident. We have, 
for example, just undergone a transformative change in family life and 
attitudes. Not all those changes have been beneficial, and attempts to reverse 
or moderate harmful changes ought not be foreclosed by a falsely teleological 
sense of social development. 
My first observation, then, is that the direction of change is not inevitably 
toward liberalized rules and thus that the socialization strategy is not 
necessarily a doomed rear-guard action. My second observation is that 
despite the many forces that impel the United States as a whole toward 
dissensus, there are probably still states and even regions in which traditional 
115. See generally L. STONE, THE FAMILY, SEX AND MARRIAGE IN ENGLAND 1500-1800 (1977). 
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social norms are widely accepted. 116 Some regions, notably the South, have 
maintained a degree of cultural distinctiveness as to family law issues, a 
distinctiveness in part sustained by differences in religious affiliation and 
other cultural traditions. Differences are even more pronounced between 
states than between regions, of course, partly because these differences are 
sustained by substantial differences in another important factor shaping 
attitudes on those issues-the degree to which they are urban or rural. While 
few regions are without urbanized states, some states remain quite rural. And 
individual states are more susceptible than whole regions to the influence of 
cultural traditions. Indeed, in at least one state-Utah-religious affiliation 
has had a predominant effect in shaping the state's culture and its family law 
attitudes. 
My third observation is one that has increasingly seemed significant to me. 
Opinions about many family law questions diverge significantly on class lines. 
Very roughly, elite elements of the upper-middle class tend toward liberal 
views; the lower-middle class tends toward conservative views. 117 As Peter 
Skerry argues, 
There is much evidence to suggest that abortion is part of a network of cultural 
issues-including gay rights, pornography, and sex education-that threatens to 
divide further the traditionally Democratic working and lower-middle classes from the 
reform wing of the party and perhaps from the mainstream of American politics. 
Abortion is part of a larger cultural conflict between certain strata of the upper-middle 
116. For example, 57% of the Southern respondents but only 41% of the Western respondents 
favored "[a) ban on all abortions except in cases of rape, incest, or when the mother's life is 
endangered." Gallup Poll, Public Opinion 1984, at 240-41 (1985). Similarly, 48~o of the Southern 
respondents but only 24% of the Western respondents thought premarital sex was wrong. Gallup 
Poll, Public Opinion 1985, at 109-11 (1986). See generally, e.g., Abrahamson & Carter, Tolerance, 
Urbanism, and Religion, 51 AM. Soc. REv. 287 (1986); Wilson, Urbanism and Tolerance: A Test of Some 
Hypotheses Drawn from Wirth and Stouffer, 50 AM. Soc. REV. 117 (1985); Stephan & McMullin, Tolerance 
of Sexual Nonconformity: City Size as a Situational and Early Learning Determinant, 4 7 AM. Soc. REv. 411 
(1982); j. REED, THE ENDURING SOUTH: SUBCULTURAL PERSISTENCE IN MASS SOCIETY (1986). 
117. It has become difficult to talk about class (or even to define the term) in post-industrial 
society, and it has always been difficult to talk about class in America. Thus, I cannot here deal in 
precise terms with whether the views I loosely attribute lO elite elements of the upper-middle class 
are better attributed to the upper-middle class generally, to the "new class," to specific sub-classes of 
the middle class, to specific status groups, to specific occupational groupings, to educated elites, or 
what have you. It is, of course, hardly easier to define the group I loosely refer to as the lower-
middle class. The following works, however, provide both evidence of the general phenomenon I am 
describing and discussions of how it is best analyzed. For a general description of changes in 
American class structure, attitudes, and behavior, see J. BENSMAN & A. VIDICH, AMERICAN SociETY: 
THE WELFARE STATE AND BEYOND (1987). That work attempts "to define and describe the emergence 
of a new America, an America dominated by a new middle class and its lifestyles." !d. at vii. For an 
analysis of some of the cultural consequences of that change, see D. BELL, THE CuLTURAL 
CoNTRADICTIONS OF CAPITALISM ( 1978). For a series of essays variously suggesting. describing, and 
denying the emergence of the "new class" (loosely defined as an "educated elite"), see THE NEw 
CLAss? (B. Bruce-Briggs ed. 1979). For a helpful and recent effort to bring some analytic rigor to the 
reasons for the "rise of left-of-center political views in broad sections of the educated middle class 
[that) has been one of the distinctive-and one of the more surprising-features of postwar 
American politics," see Brim, "New-Class" and Cumulative Trend Explanations of the Liberal Political 
Attitudes of Professionals, 90 AM. J. Soc. 30, 30 (1984). For an extensive description of the differences 
in class view between elites and non-elites, see H. McCLOSKE:Y & A. BRILL, DIMENSIONS OF 
TOLERANCE: WHAT AMERICANS BELIEVE ABOUT CIVIL LIBERTIES (1983), particularly chapter 5, The 
Rights of Privacy and Lifestyles. See also sources cited infra note 120. 
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class-the highly educated professionals, scientists, and intellectuals-and the mass of 
Americans who comprise the working and lower-middle classes. 118 
109 
These class differences are exacerbated by the fact that many of those who 
partake most strongly of the views I have described as lower-middle class are 
also distanced from elite culture by their membership in relatively recent 
immigrant groups and in lower-status religious groups. All this represents a 
remarkable historical shift. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
the upper-middle class is often thought to have imposed restrictive social 
rules on an unwilling lower-middle class (and particularly on ethnic groups); 
today the upper-middle class wants to escape those rules while the lower-
middle class (particularly, though far from exclusively, many of its ethnic 
components) wants to retain them. In sum, as in that earlier period, we see 
once again not only a dispute over the substance of the law and over the kind 
of community we are to be, but a dispute over the status of contending 
elements of American society. Now, however, the lower, and not the higher, 
status groups are the ones that seem to be struggling to sustain existing social 
rules.I 19 
This broad cultural and political conflict is intensified, I believe, by an 
attitude that has always been present, but which we may have allowed 
ourselves to forget. It is the feeling that reason is the best guide to policy, 
that the educated-particularly professionals like lawyers-are better 
equipped to reason than the less educated, and that the educated are 
therefore better equipped and better entitled to govern. This feeling finds its 
institutional expression in a preference for extending the authority of courts, 
the branch of government to which the elite has the easiest and in many ways 
the most exclusive access. This feeling has, I believe, been intensified by 
several issues-particularly issues involving race, crime, and religion-about 
which there have been marked class differences and about which the elite has 
been especially certain of its rectitude. These issues have reinforced in many 
of the elite the sense that the majority is likely to be corrupt and tyrannical 
and the political process to be unrepresentative and that this necessitates a 
vanguard of the majority which will rule in the majority's stead and better 
interests and in the interests of all minorities. I have been struck at how often 
I observed these attitudes in one place of present privilege and future 
power-among my former classmates and my current students, a startling 
number of whom believe that their education (espeGially their legal 
education}, their intellectual ability, and their freedom from prejudice and 
from the superstition of religion give them a superior moral claim to political 
power. Such beliefs contribute to and are reinforced by their passionate 
118. Skerry, The Class Conflict over Abortion, THE Pus. INTEREST, Summer 1978, at 69, 70. 
119. Cj j. GUSFIELD, SYMBOLIC CRUSADE: STATUS POLITICS AND THE AMERICAN TEMPERANCE 
MovEMENT (1963). I am not adopting Gusfield's argument that status discontent has caused the 
social attitudes described here. Insofar as I am making a causal argument, it is that differences over 
social issues have been exacerbated by class antagonisms. See Wood & Hughes, The J"'oral Basis of 
Moral Reform: Status Discontent vs. Culture and Socialization as Explanations of Anti-Pornography Sonal 
Movement Adherence, 49 AM. Soc. REv. 86 (1984). 
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commitment to a conception of judicial review which emphasizes the failings 
of democratic processes and majorities and the superior enlightenment of 
judges. The lower-middle class has, partly in response, come to feel disvalued 
and even despised. Its relative lack of education, its relative depth of religious 
belief, and its mistaken and improper social views, it has been made to 
understand, evidence its relative unfitness to participate in government. 120 
I believe that a deplorable consequence of the constitutionalization of 
family law has been to increase the confidence of the elite and the bitterness 
of the rest. It has increased the confidence of the elite to discover once more 
an issue about which the democratic branches of government have proved 
irresponsible. It has increased t,he bitterness of the rest to learn that their 
views on social policy are once again notjust vanquished, and notjust wrong, 
but constitutionally illegitimate. 121 In short, a socially destructive situation 
has arisen whose consequences need at least to be considered in thinking 
about the constitutionalization of social issues generally and vice issues 
particular! y. 
C. The Constitutionalization of Social Issues: Conflict and Compromise 
I would conclude from these three observations that, if social dissensus 
about family law issues is not inevitable, and if a particular state has 
something like social consensus as to them, 122 that state's legislature ought to 
be constitutionally able to make the socialization policy one of its interests. 
Acknowledging that policy as a legitimate interest might promote a goal we 
120. Let me give an anecdotal illustration of the attitudes that give rise to this feeling. I recently 
received (at my office and my home) what purported to be an "official document" from the ACLU 
which was intended to persuade me to urge that former Attorney General Meese be removed from 
office. I do not admire the former Attorney General, but I detest this sentence from the ACLU's 
cover letter: "[I]t is only a very small and special group of Americans (less than l ro) who understand 
the importance of fighting to sustain individual freedom .... " For scholarly examinations of the 
attitudes that underlie such arrogance and of the lower-middle-class reaction to it, see Hochschild, 
Dimensions of Liberal Self-Satisfaction: Civil Liberties, Liberal Theory, and Elite-1\Iass Differences, 96 ETHICS 
386 (1986); Smith, Book Review, 72 CALIF. L. REv. 908 (1984) (reviewing H. McCLOSKEY & A. BRILL, 
supra note 117); j. RIEDER, CANARSIE: THE jEWS AND ITALIANS OF BROOKLYN AGAINST LIBERALISM 
(1985); K. LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD (1984); B. BERGER & P. BERGER, THE 
WAR OVER THE FAMILY (1984); R. NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQ.UARE (1984); P. CLECAK, 
AMERICA'S QUEST FOR THE IDEAL SELF: DISSENT AND FULFILLMENT IN THE 60s AND 70S, at 70-75, 125-
44 (1983); Rodes, Greatness Thrust Upon Them: Class Biases in American Law, 28 AM. J. juRISPRUDENCE l 
(1983); Skerry, supra ,note 118, at 69; Page & Clelland, The Kanawha County Textbook Controversy: A 
Study of the Politics of Life Style Concern, 57 Soc. FoRCES 265 ( 1978). For a discussion of lawyers in this 
respect, see Glazer, Lawyers and the New Class, in THE NEW CLAss? ch. 7 (B. Bruce-Briggs ed. 1979). 
121. I am not, of course, suggesting that any time there are class differences over social issues, 
the Court is inhibited from finding legislative action unconstitutional. Where, as in the race 
situation, the Constitution speaks directly to an issue and there is an overriding moral imperative, 
these class considerations are much less pressing, although sensitivity to them is both tactically wise 
and ethically compelled. 
122. Ordinarily, a statute need only be supported by a majority (as that term is applied in a 
representative democracy), and I am suggesting no change in that standard. I refer to consensus 
here because some significant level of social agreement, although hardly anything like unanimity, is 
necessary to make the socializing strategy work optimally. I suspect that the requirement of a 
consensus is, if anything, too strict, since a legislature may sometimes plausibly believe that a 
socializing strategy is worth employing as part of an attempt to build, and not just sustain, desirable 
social attitudes. 
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discussed in the first half of this essay-helping courts assess state interests 
less rigidly, more complexly, and more fully. It might, in other words, 
increase the analytic flexibility and frankness so often lacking in fundamental-
rights reasoning. But I wish here to emphasize an advantage of recognizing 
the socializing strategy that responds to some of the concerns I raised in part 
IV.B-that it would ease social compromise. Such compromise seems to me 
desirable in most areas of public policy in a democracy, and particularly so in 
matters as emotionally and morally freighted and perplexing as family law. 
That is, compromise is desirable where substantial numbers (and especially 
where substantial identifiable groups) of reasonable citizens differ on 
legitimate grounds as to matters about which they feel deeply and as to which 
losing (especially losing in a way which emphasizes the illegitimacy of their 
opinions) will deprive them of a sense-or worse, the reality-of participation 
in the polity. 
But compromise is easy to want and hard to get. How can social disputes 
be structured to promote compromise? Courts are sometimes thought of as 
neutral arbiters and thus as good architects of compromise. However, the 
capacity of courts to achieve social compromise has significant limits. Some of 
these limits have to do with the structure of litigation. For instance, the 
adversary system, and the likelihood that a court's decision will proclaim a 
winner and loser, set initial limits. That cases come up one at a time means 
that all the issues that would need to be included in a compromise are unlikely 
to be judicially resolved simultaneously and that all the parties to a dispute are 
unlikely to be involved simultaneously. Indeed, in any complex social dispute, 
some parties are likely to be interested in some aspects of the dispute, but not 
in others. These factors make it unlikely that all the parties can be persuaded 
to come together and work out or accept a judicial compromise to which all 
would be committed. In politics, a compromise which commits the parties can 
expressly or implicitly be negotiated among them and because of that fact can 
often be informally enforced; in litigation, the parties may not realize that a 
compromise point has been reached, and in any event there is little to stop 
anyone, "party" or not, from bringing the next suit and thus disrupting the 
compromise. Yet other factors limit the capacity of courts to orchestrate 
social compromise. Because of the pressure to develop an internally 
consistent line of cases and because judicial legitimacy is generally thought to 
inhere in disciplined reasoning from principles, a court's ability to shape a 
compromise is much constrained. Further, since legal categories are often 
not the categories which matter to the parties, even if a court wishes to and 
legitimately may construct a compromise, it may be unable to evaluate 
accurately the scope and intensity of the parties' preferences. Finally, to 
phrase a dispute in terms of rights, particularly constitutional rights, inhibits 
compromise by raising the moral and social stakes that appear to be at risk. 123 
123. See Schneider, supra note 3, at part V. C. 
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More specifically, social compromise is impeded by present fundamental-
rights state-interest analysis. By now, at least, when the Supreme Court 
addresses family law problems, it is often not perceived as a neutral arbiter. 
Rather, it is perceived in many quarters as parti pris, as speaking outside of its 
proper authority and in the interests of its own professional and class 
perspectives. In addition, any desire the Court might have to construct a 
compromise is hobbled by its reluctance to acknowledge that any state 
interest can override a fundamental right and by the rigidity and artificiality 
that reluctance imparts to privacy jurisprudence. Finally, the best 
compromise is often one that dampens controversy before it becomes 
untamable. Yet constitutional litigation, by providing a well-publicized 
national forum for dispute and by offering a means of securing quick, 
national, and presumably final changes in the law, often ~parks rather than 
dampens controversy. 
This is not to say that compromise is impossible in the present system of 
privacy law. The entire body of privacy-rights law can be seen as an attempted 
compromise in which Bowers v. Hardwick (which held that prohibitions of 
homosexual sodomy are constitutional) balances Roe v. Wade and its progeny. 
But such a compromise is hardly likely to work. Partly this is for the reasons 
described above. For example, because Roe and Bowers arose seriatim and not 
simultaneously, Roe provoked an opposition which by the time of Bowers had 
defined itself in terms to which Bowers was in important ways irrelevant. 
Further, the social groups interested in the two cases are not identical. Nor 
can they be assured that the two cases represent a stable compromise, since 
they cannot know when someone will bring another suit which might alter the 
status quo. 
Moreover, Bowers itself illustrates the awkwardness of compromise under 
the present system of privacy law. First, the case provokes serious doctrinal 
confusions, since most commentators and many courts not unreasonably 
thought that the privacy cases created a broad Millian privacy right which 
comfortably encompassed freedom in sexual matters between consenting 
adults. 124 Such doctrinal perplexities typify the problems presented when 
compromise is attempted within a doctrinal area which the Court must 
attempt to treat as coherent. Second, the compromise of Bowers is in some 
ways especially troublesome, since the burden on homosexuals seems 
particularly onerous and since the state interest seems particularly 
problematic. 
Of course, other forms of compromise are possible within the present 
system. In the abortion context, for example, the Court might after Roe have 
allowed the states to regulate abortion in many of the peripheral ways they 
have attempted in response to Roe. Indeed, the Court seemed briefly to be 
124. For evidence of this view and for an argument that the view was, in practice if not logic, 
unwarranted, see Grey, supra note 45, at 83. 
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doing just that in the abortion-funding cases. 125 However, as the body of 
post-Roe abortion cases reveals, such compromise is cramped by the pressure 
to develop a consistent definition of the privacy right and by the weakness of 
state-interest analysis.I26 
In sum, although the present form of fourteenth amendment privacy law 
does not foreclose compromise, its rigidity and artificiality (and the nature of 
adjudication) inhibit it. I suggest that one consequence of a more 
accommodating state-interest analysis would be that compromise could be 
achieved, and achieved more easily, through federalism. In other words, 
under such an analysis, states which wished to legislate in sensitive areas could 
more readily do so; those states which did not wish to do so would not have 
to. This local-choice policy would help remove several unduly divisive 
issues-abortion is an obvious example-from national politics. It would 
allow citizens who felt strongly about family law issues to affect their state's 
law without imposing on states whose citizens felt differently. The local-
choice policy could also help to soften the class hostility I described earlier by 
reducing the frequency with which the lower-middle class's views are ruled 
constitutionally unacceptable (without, of course, relieving that class of the 
obligation to fight politically for its policies). 
Abortion provides a test case for much I have said here about social 
conflict and social compromise. In 1959, the ALI's Model Penal Code 
proposed a liberalized abortion law. In the early 1960's, an abortion-reform 
movement, propelled by a host of powerful forces and establishment 
organizations, rapidly gathered momentum. Between 1967 and 1971, 
seventeen states, including California and New York, reformed their abortion 
laws. California's new statute was moderate in tone but made abortion readily 
available; New York's instituted a scheme quite close to that eventually 
enacted in Roe. The legislative debates, as I remember them, were 
exemplary-earnest essays in morals and politics. It was at this point that the 
Court intervened with Roe v. Wade. 
Had the Court not acted, I suppose the political process would have 
continued to deal with abortion. A number of states, particularly Northern 
and coastal states, would have adopted reforms which, in intent or in result, 
125. Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Harris v. McRae, 448 
U.S. 297 (1980). On abortion funding as an area of compromise, and for an illuminating discussion 
of compromise in abortion policy, see Sher, Subsidiud Abortion: Moral Rights and Moral Compromise, 10 
PHIL. & Pus. AFF. 361 (1981). For an argument that, rather than simply deciding cases and thereby 
annointing winners and casting out losers, "[t]he substance of the Court's actions must be guided by 
the same principle as its form: to provoke and to redefine disputes that might lead contending 
parties toward mutual accommodation ... ," see Burt, The Constitution of the Family, 1979 SuP. CT. 
REv. 329, 393. For a thoughtful discussion of some legal techniques for achieving social 
compromise, one including a treatment of compromise over abortion, see G. CALABRESI, supra note 
97, at 87-114. See also G. CALABRESI & P. BoBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES (1978). For a valuable 
consideration of compromise in contemporary abortion law, see Kaplan, Abortion as a Vice Crime: A 
"What If" Story, LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1988, at 151. 
126. See, e.g., Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983); Thornburgh 
v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986). See also my discussion 
at notes 26-35, supra. 
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would have made abortion virtually as available as it is today. A number of 
other states, particularly Southern and Western states, would not have done 
so. Neither pro- nor anti-abortion groups would have been entirely happy. 
But parties to a compromise rarely are, and both sides would have had much 
to be satisfied with. Abortions would have been available to anyone able to • 
travel and to pay for the abortion. (Recall that even today many states do not 
pay for abortions for the poor and there is evidence that private philanthropy 
has done so instead.) Yet where anti-abortion feelings were strongest, the 
state would have expressed them. And because abortion would not have been 
given the national forum and the national publicity which Roe provided, a 
divisive and distorting influence would probably have been kept out of 
national politics. 
The usual response to suggestions about social compromise in this area is 
that those who favor relatively restrictive family law rules should not be 
allowed to impose their views on other people, whatever state they live in. 
Part of the answer to that, of course, is that they may do so where the statute 
they use to do it has a sufficiently strong state interest. As I argued in part III, 
the socialization argument attempts to show how such rules may constrain 
harmful behavior and thus meet the state-interest test. But another part of 
the answer is that someone's views are inescapably going to be imposed on 
everyone else. As Professor Hochschild argues, 
The very insistence that all viewpoints and most actions must be tolerated necessarily 
elevates one set of values above all others. There is no way around that conundrum; 
tolerance of all values requires that one value (tolerance) dominate all others. To 
some, this point is merely a clever ploy in a parlor game . . . . But to others, this point 
is a serious problem; their values or their definition of freedom (whether class 
revolution, fundamental Protestantism, or vegetarianism) are necessarily denied in a 
tolerant society . . . . [T]he question of the inhibitions required by tolerance is 
particularly problematic when the tension between civil liberties and other values 
parallels the split between elites and masses. When elites hold the values that 
epitomize liberalism, at least in the eyes of other elites, there is little opportunity for 
the mass public even to express, never mind institute, coherent and powerful 
alternatives. 127 
Society necessarily is a system for producing ways of living, for 
constructing social reality and social meaning. Governmental institutions are 
unavoidably part of that process, and the Court often is urged by its admirers 
to be. Governmental institutions in fact have a particularly important role in 
the process, in part because they alone are expected to speak for society as a 
whole. I would not suggest that government neutrality and social tolerance 
are meaningless ideas, but for the reasons Professor Hochschild suggests, 
they often are unattainable in some important contexts. They are often 
unattainable when government helps construct social reality, for someone's 
view of reality must prevail. They are often unattainable when contending 
social groups feel they must struggle to preserve a way of life which they wish 
to lead and in which they wish to raise their children. 
127. Hochschild, supra note 120, at 398. 
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There is much to be said for the elite's argument that its positions are the 
tolerant ones. But given the difficulties of locating genuinely tolerant ground, 
courts, as nonmajoritarian and elite governmental institutions, need at least to 
be sensitive to the fact that the elite's tolerant positions and its substantive 
positions conspicuously tend to coincide. The "tolerant" positions on 
creationism in schools, sex education, pornography, divorce, sodomy, 
fornication, and cohabitation all reflect the elite's substantive preferences. 12s 
Sensitivity is called for in part because it may alert courts to the times when 
the labels of tolerance and intolerance are being used inaccurately. Abortion 
provides an instance. It is often said that the anti-abortion position is 
intolerant and the pro-abortion position is tolerant (thus its advocates 
describe it as the "pro-choice" position). But if anti-abortionists are correct 
that fetuses are human beings, then criminalizing abortion is entirely within 
the range of the ordinary assumption that government has the power and 
even the duty to define and protect what it plausibly takes to be human life 
and that citizens may and should elect a government that will do so. Only by 
judicially imposing the view that fetuses are not human did Roe v. Wade make 
abortion a right and foreclose its opponents from exercising their otherwise 
commonplace power to act through the government to protect what they 
plausibly take to be human life. Yet, in no other area has the government 
been thought unauthorized to define "life." And when impositions of this 
kind are made by judicial constitutional decisions, they disturbingly state, at 
various levels of explicitness, that the losing side's views are illegitimate. 129 
128. Laws requiring motorcyclists to wear helmets may be an exception which proves the rule. 
129. The opinion in Roe was particularly troubling on this score. As Dean Calabresi writes, 
The Court, when it said that fetuses are not persons for purposes of due process, said to a large 
and politically active group: "Your metaphysics are not part of our constitution." This is far 
worse (and more dangerous) in a pluralistic society than the statement the Court sought to avoid 
making, namely, "Sorry, but your metaphysics are wrong. A fetus is not alive." 
When ... the Court proclaimed that the truth of the beliefs did not matter ... it immediately 
made that Constitution unacceptable to the holder of those beliefs. It said to highly defensive 
groups comprised in significant part of recent immigrants that their highest beliefs, their 
metaphysics, are not part of our law as represented by its most fundamental statement, the 
Constitution .... It told them ... that ... they could not be true Americans so long as they held 
to their beliefs. This was catastrophic because it reinforced doubts which the holders of anti-
abortion beliefs already had about their full acceptance in American society. 
G. CALABRESI, supra note 97, at 95-96. Nor, with the possible exception of the abortion-funding 
cases, can the Court's later abortion opinions be called emollient. The Court has treated with 
suspicion the states' attempts to locate the highly uncertain line between permissible and 
impermissible abortion regulations, Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & 
Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986), and has associated opponents of abortion with racists by harshly 
quoting Brown v. Board of Education, (" '[I]t should go without saying that the vitality of these 
constitutional principles cannot be allowed to yield simply because of disagreement with them.' " 
Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 759 (quoting Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1954)). 
The legislative opposition to Roe, when viewed in the light of the differences between the post-Roe 
and the post-Brown cases, does not justify so haughty a judicial response. The Court in Brown, 
whatever that opinion's faults and whatever the ambiguities of the fourteenth amendment, was 
interpreting a constitutional text plainly directed at the problem of race. See Wechsler, Toward Neutral 
Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REv. I (1959). The Court in Roe, whatever the Lochner-era 
precedents, was interpreting a constitutional text which did not address explicitly, and which until 
shortly before had not been thought to address implicitly, the problem of privacy. The Court in 
Brown was unanimous; the Court in Roe was divided. The Court after Brown had become increasingly 
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Sensitivity to the coincidence of the elite's tolerant and substantive 
positions is desirable for other reasons. For instance, insensitivity on this 
score exacerbates the problem of persuading the public that the government 
can act neutrally and is acting neutrally. That problem often arises when, for 
example, the government seeks to decriminalize behavior-fornication or the 
use of marijuana, for example-without suggesting a moral view of that 
behavior. People are less easily persuaded that the governmental action is 
neutral if they observe that neutrality seems to serve the substantive purposes 
of an identifiable group. Sensitivity to the coincidence of the elite's tolerant 
and substantive positions also may help courts realize that tolerance is 
sometimes perceived differently by different classes because of differences in 
their class experiences. Elites, for example, may be more tolerant of 
prostitution than the rest of society because they are less likely to encounter it 
involuntarily or to experience its environmental side effects. Such sensitivity 
may also help courts realize when to apply Professor Hochschild's warning 
that neutrality is sometimes impossible. This sensitivity is particularly needed 
at a time when the Court is widely called upon to be the great teacher of 
tolerance. Such sensitivity, then, should be part of a decision to 
constitutionalize a social issue and should inform judicial decisions once an 
area of law has been constitutionalized. 
The social and political controversy over the privacy doctrine is in part a 
battle about modernity and modernization, for the views of the elite are very 
much those of modernity. In the United States, as throughout the world, 
determined; the Court after Roe showed signs of doubts. The Court after Brown relied on and 
received crucial support from the political branches of government; the Court after Roe received 
relatively weak support from the political branches of government, and the President's appointment 
power was being used to reverse Roe. For all these reasons, then, there was greater cause to suppose 
that Roe more than Brown might be judicially limited and thus legitimately probed and even auacked 
through legislation and litigation. 
In addition, the persistence of the legislative response to Roe has much to do with the Court's own 
failings. The Court, as we have seen, did not specify clearly what standard lO use in examining the 
state interest in the post-Roe cases. Furthermore, many of the post-Roe cases have invalidated 
legislation on means, not purpose, grounds, thus seeming to suggest that a beuer drafted statute 
might be permissible. Indeed, much of the post-Roe legislation seemed directly responsive to hints in 
Roe and its sequelae, including the abortion-funding cases. In any event, resistance to novel 
constitutional doctrine is, within important limits, a legitimate part of the system of checks and 
balances. 
A final difference between the post-Brown and the post-Roe cases has to do with the underlying 
moral positions of the opponents of the two cases. Racism is hardly defensible; anti-abortionism, 
while justifiably controversial, is at least a plausible moral position, and it is one which can plausibly 
be thought to oblige its adherents to use every legitimate means to curtail abortion. Under all these 
circumstances, then, the Court's condemnatory response to legislative auempts to restrict abortion 
to the constitutional minimum seems to indicate a hypersensitivity to its own righteousness and an 
insensitivity to the nature of the opposition to Roe. 
I dwell on this point at perhaps undue length because I have been struck by the frequency with 
which arguments of the kind I have made in this essay meet with the response that similar arguments 
might have produced a different result in Brown. It seems to me precisely a drawback of the trend 
toward constitutionalizing social issues that it encourages applying the same reasoning and rhetoric 
to social issues of widely differing kinds, and particularly that it makes Brown the paradigm rights 
case. Brown dealt with the great moral crisis of mid-twentieth-century America. Solutions that are 
appropriate to such a crisis are not necessarily appropriate to less severe social problems. 
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resistance to modernity has found renewed voice. 130 How much more it has 
found remains to be seen. But the question the battle raises is what kind of 
society we are to be. Politics is ordinarily the way in which such conflicts are 
worked out. And political solutions to such conflicts have their advantages. 
First, they need not be justified in an analytically rigorous way, a kind of 
justification that, as the Court's struggles with the privacy doctrine indicate, is 
tolerably, perhaps intolerably, hard to come by. Indeed, a drawback of relying 
on courts to resolve these conflicts is that courts must rely on reason, and not 
just on reason, but on their own, cramped, lawyer's ideas about what reason 
is. Yet the usefulness of judicial reason in these areas is limited by the 
absence of the kind of empirical evidence that would make rational analysis 
possible, by the fact that many family law statutes work (if they work) 
nonrationally, and by the fact that these statutes implicate basic value choices 
to which the Constitution either does not speak or only mumbles. There is, in 
short, no reason to believe the Court is likely to produce a wiser solution to 
the problems of modernity than the political branches, and there is some 
reason to believe that its solutions are likely to be distorted by its own 
composition and, as Weber would remind us, by its own modernizing 
function. 
A further advantage of a political, as opposed to a judicial, solution to the 
conflict over what sort of society we are to be is that it can give people some 
sense of control over their environments and their lives. That sense of 
control is particularly important, I would suppose, for people who for 
economic and social reasons have relatively little of it anyway and who 
confront an elite equipped notjust with considerable political power, but with 
prepotent cultural power. 
In evaluating the problems I have been considering in this essay, we need 
to look dispassionately and realistically at what a more flexible state-interest 
standard, or even the deconstitutionalization of family law, would actually 
mean. In much of the country and as to many privacy issues, either change 
would make little immediate difference, given the present liberalizing 
tendency: Many of the reforms which have been or might be required 
constitutionally have been widely adopted legislatively. Many of the states 
which have not reformed their statutes rarely enforce them. Generally 
speaking, there has never been a time in American society when the range of 
choices about family and sexual life has been as great as it is now. This is not 
only because of the relative weakness of both formal and informal social 
regulation, but because of the relative wealth both of individuals (which gives 
people access to more ways of living and increases their capacity to resist 
social control) and of society (which increases the kinds of activities which can 
be made available and decreases society's need to regulate many forms of 
behavior). Nor would the values expressed by the privacy doctrine go 
unrepresented even if family law were deconstitutionalized: First, rights 
130. It has actually found several, often conflicting, voices. Much of the "counterculture" of the 
1960's, for instance, expressed a different (and, in class terms, differently situated) anti-modernism. 
118 LAw AND CoNTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 51: No. 1 
thinking is far too deeply ingrained in the American mind; second, elite 
positions (which are, as we should recall, generally liberal ones) on family law 
issues are, by hypothesis, those of people well situated economically, socially, 
and politically to defend them.l 31 Indeed, despite a popular conservative 
President and apparent conservative electoral power, the conservative "social 
program" remains conspicuously unenacted. 132 Further, although I have 
argued against too blithely assuming that social charige is unidirectional, we 
may be undergoing a change in attitudes toward family law matters that will 
eventually be quite complete, so that what is now the elite view will become 
nearly universal. Let me suggest two kinds of evidence that the modernists 
will win as they have won before. The first is the stunning rate of change in 
family and sexual life, a rate that suggests that the forces impelling it-for 
example, increasing urbanization, education, and economic well-being-run 
deep. 133 The second is the fact that the young are almost thoughout society 
much friendlier to the relevant aspects of modernity than the old. Consider, 
for instance, the fascinating study of young elite evangelicals by James 
Davison Hunter, which indicates that evangelicals generally, and younger 
evangelicals particularly, are moving toward modernist views about many 
social issues involving the family .134 If the salt of tradition have lost his 
savour, wherewith shall it be salted? In short, if the change will occur anyway, 
the problem is to accomplish it as painlessly as possible, which will not be 
done by making the change a national and class issue. 
v 
CoNCLUSION 
I embarked on this essay to learn something about the desirability of 
constitutionalizing social issues like family law and vice. To narrow the essay's 
focus, I selected one aspect of fourteenth amendment privacy law, namely, 
state-interest analysis. I found a good deal to criticize. Doctrinally, the 
Court's troubles began in its efforts to formulate a standard for evaluating 
state interests. Once that standard was established, the Court found that it 
could not always be used. Even when it used the established standard, the 
Court did not define the standard's terms. The Court developed several 
131. For a description of a situation in which Congress and federal administrative agencies were 
more rights-oriented than the courts, see R. KATZMANN, iNSTITUTIONAL DISABILITY: THE SAGA OF 
TRANSPORTATION POLICY FOR THE DISABLED ( 1986). 
132. See Schneider, supra note 103, at 1870-75. 
133. See generally P. CLECAK, supra note 120. 
134. j. HUNTER, EVANGELICALISM: THE COMING GENERATION (1987). He writes that 
large sectors of the Evangelical population (particularly within the younger cohort) no longer 
accept the legitimacy of traditional (bourgeois) role assignments, and one is left with a normative 
pattern of family life that is very untraditional indeed. . . . [T}he Evangelical family specialists 
(including many ministers) advocate and defend a model of the family that is said to be traditional but in fact 
has no real historical precedent in Christendom or anywhere else) [sic] in the name of a constituency that 
has largely abandoned it in favor of an androgynous/ quasi-androgynous model. 
!d. at 114 (emphasis in original). See also Skerry, supra note 118, at 77, who cites evidence of declining 
class differences in the relationships of husbands and wives. 
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substitutes for defining those terms, but the substitutes were problematic in 
principle and, partly because of the Court's difficulties with empirical 
evidence, unsatisfactory in practice. This series of failings is troubling notjust 
because it represents serious doctrinal deficiencies, but because it suggests 
and exacerbates the severity of some of the larger problems with 
constitutionalizing social issues. These larger problems are further suggested 
and exacerbated by the Court's tendency to see statutes in isolation from their 
legal context. Finally, the Court's insensitivity to the social, cultural, and 
political contexts of privacy disputes has further diminished its capacity to 
analyze them acutely or resolve them wisely. 
This essay is meant to be exploratory, not dispositive; suggestive, not 
conclusive. But it points to some promising lines of inquiry into the problem 
of constitutionalizing social issues. For instance, the Court's doctrinal 
difficulties with defining privacy suggest that a social issue may be inapt for 
constitutionalization if the novel constitutional principle to be employed is 
not reasonably clear, reasonably coherent, and reasonably limited. The 
Court's doctrinal difficulties in formulating and applying a standard for 
evaluating state interests suggest that a social issue may be inapt for 
constitutionalization when the state's interests are numerous, various, and 
weighty and when they operate in complicated ways that are not well 
understood. The Court's limited view of the state interests that may conflict 
with privacy rights and its incapacity to take into account the political and 
social context in which its decisions operate suggest that a social issue may be 
inapt for constitutionalization where the issue is difficult and embedded in 
larger political, social, and cultural conflicts. A common theme of these 
suggestions may be that complex social issues are inapt for 
constitutionalization, at least where the constitutional text gives courts little 
guidance and where courts cannot devote detailed and sustained attention to 
the problem. 
The criticisms I have made seem to me to indicate some reasons to look 
skeptically at the constitutionalization of social issues like family law and vice. 
Nevertheless, I wish to restate what may have been obscured during my 
examination of standard state-interest analysis and my cautious and 
conditional defense of the facial constitutional legitimacy of the socialization 
argument. First, I have not argued that the Court's problems with its state-
interest formulae are necessarily fatal to the enterprise of fourteenth 
amendment privacy. I have not done so partly because any such conclusion 
would depend on a full study of the fundamental-rights side of the ledger 
(and, for that matter, on a fuller treatment than I have attempted here of the 
state-interest side). Furthermore, the Court's problems with its formulae 
should be evaluated in terms of the inconveniences and inadequacies of any 
judicial formula and in terms of the undoubted services-of discipline, 
economy, and predictability-such formulae render. Second, I have not 
endorsed the "socialization" argument as a matter of legislative policy. I have 
not done so because I have not yet worked out what I think about it generally 
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and because I am opposed to its implementation in many particulars. It bears 
emphasizing that my argument in this essay leaves me free to oppose that 
strategy politically: I have simply argued that the socialization strategy may 
sometimes be regarded as a legitimate state interest in fourteenth amendment 
cases. Third, I have not contended that a statute defended on socialization 
grounds ought necessarily to prevail against a privacy attack. I have not done 
so because, accepting arguendo fourteenth amendment privacy rights, I do not 
regard every statutory implementation of the socialization strategy, however 
marginal or intrusive, as inevitably strong enough to withstand any privacy 
attack, however pressing. 
On the other hand, I acknowledge that my criticisms and doubts could 
corrode fourteenth amendment privacy doctrine as now understood. This is 
true for several reasons. First, the doctrinal failings I have described are 
serious and significantly curtail the Court's capacity to evaluate state interests 
accurately and to weigh them intelligently against privacy rights. Second, 
those failings indicate that the Court has not successfully rationalized the 
privacy doctrine's constitutional status or its social function. Third, the 
socialization argument could turn out to have a considerable scope and thus 
put considerable constraints on privacy rights. Fourth, the seriousness of the 
social and cultural conflicts I have described and the desirability of social and 
political compromise both suggest at least the need for more sensitivity, tact, 
and judgment in deploying the privacy doctrine. 
How alarmed one should be at any corrosion of the privacy doctrine 
depends in part on how certain one is of its constitutional legitimacy. I myself 
am inclined to believe that the privacy doctrine was unfounded as a matter of 
constitutional interpretation and unwise as a matter of judicial policy. This is 
not the place to explore those doubts. 135 But let me close by suggesting that 
insights into them may be derived from some of the analytic approaches 
developed in this paper. For example, a more complex understanding of the 
privacy right may be reached by recalling what we learned about the 
propensity in state-interest analysis to isolate factors for analysis. The Court's 
formulae, we saw, break thought into fragments, isolating means from ends, 
means from means, and ends from ends. The Court's techniques have the 
same effect on the personal-rights side of the equation. There we see a right 
to privacy usually justified by its role in promoting autonomy. Autonomy is 
an individual and a social good. But it too needs to be seen in its context. Let 
us briefly look at how this might be begun. 
Two considerations suggest how complex privacy analysis would be if 
autonomy were taken in context. First, autonomy is not the only individual 
and social good, and thus unlimited autonomy is unlikely to be individually 
desired or socially desirable-or, of course, even possible. What is needed, 
then, is to make available an optimal, not a maximal, level of autonomy. 
Calculating the optimal level of autonomy is complicated, since in doing so 
135. I have tried to explore some of the reasons for this inclination in Schneider. supra note 103. 
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one needs to consider everything that contributes to autonomy, including the 
expansive range of choices and freedoms modernity brings. Because the 
Court hears only the cases that come to it and hears them one at a time, it is 
ill-situated to have a good sense of either the optimal or the actual level of 
autonomy. It can only weigh what it takes to be the unilateral good of 
autonomy against whatever particular interests the state proposes. 
Second, even if autonomy were a unilateral good, it still might not be best 
served by sustaining every privacy-based autonomy claim. Once again, such 
claims need to be seen in context. The regulations that are challenged in 
privacy cases are intended to help construct and sustain social institutions for 
the conduct of sexual and family life. Such regulations limit autonomy in the 
interests of those institutions. But such "restrictive" institutions can 
themselves heighten the socially available level of autonomy, and thus the 
privacy doctrine ought not too lightly be used to erode such institutions. 
First, as Martin Krygier writes, "There are many social situations where our 
decisions are strategically interdependent [with the decisions of other people] 
. . . . [I]n such situations, norms will be generated which provide 'some 
anchorage; some preeminently conspicuous indication as to what action is likely 
to be taken by (most of) the others ... .' " 136 The institutions created by such 
norms, then, enhance the level of available autonomy by improving the ability 
of people to predict and thus to rely on and cope with the behavior of other 
people. 
These "restrictive" institutions can augment autonomy in a second way. 
Without such institutions every individual would have to decide personally 
every detail about how to organize his life. "Today," Peter Berger writes, "it 
is not so much that individuals become convinced of their capacity and right 
to choose new ways of life, but rather that tradition is weakened to the point 
where they must choose between alternatives whether they wish it or not .... 
[O]ne of the most archaic functions of society is to take away from individuals 
the burden of choice.'' 137 The point here is not that the burden of choice is in 
any particular instance intolerable; it is that at some point the combined 
burdens become intolerable, or at least become so numerous as to distract 
one from other significant choices and thus to detract from one's autonomy in 
other areas. 138 
Restrictive institutions may enhance autonomy in a third way. Social 
critics of many stripes see American culture and personality as molded by the 
demands of a modern consumerist, capitalist society. On the view of such 
critics, individual people, even small groups of people, are too weakly situated 
to shape their own lives in the face of such demands. Government is perhaps 
the only social institution strong enough to support the restrictive institutions 
136. Krygier, Law as Tradition, 5 LAw & PHIL. 237, 258-59 (1986) (emphasis in original). 
137. P. BERGER, Toward a Critique of Modernity, in FACING UP TO MoDERNITY 77 (1977) (emphasis in 
original). See generally P. BERGER, THE HERETICAL IMPERATIVE l-29 (1979). 
138. For example, see A. CHERLIN, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, REMARRIAGE 87-89 (1981) for an 
examination of the problems caused for parents in second marriages by the absence of institutional 
guidelines for such households. 
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which can be one assertion of the individual against the pressures of those 
economic forces. For the large number of people who want to live in a society 
given stability, familiarity, and seriousness by restrictive institutions and the 
values they represent, government's support of those institutions is a pre-
eminent means to effectuate their choice about how to live. And employing 
the government for that purpose can help give them the sense of efficacy, of 
control over their environment, which is a prerequisite to any exercise of 
autonomy. 139 
These brief co~ments, then, are intended as hints that the criticisms I 
have made of the Court's state-interest analysis may point us to similar kinds 
of criticisms of the Court's fundamental-rights analysis generally. Some of 
those criticisms will have to do with the kind of difficulties I discussed in the 
first part of this essay-difficulties in articulating the privacy right and in 
applying its accompanying doctrinal equipment. Others of those criticisms 
will have to do with the kind of difficulties I discussed in the second part of 
this essay-difficulties with the social consequences of constitutionalization. 
The reader may well feel that ultimately, both sets of difficulties (though 
particularly the latter set) are more properly political than constitutional. But 
of course that is exactly the point: In deciding privacy cases, courts have been 
dealing primarily not with questions about how social disputes are generally 
to be structured, but rather with how a particular social dispute should be 
resolved. That is what makes substantive due process special. But society's 
needs and wants are much more fluid, complex, and opaque than 
constitutional thought-which must develop rules of wide and determinate 
applicability that properly and permanently balance basic values-can easily 
accommodate or than judges-who have many other calls on their abilities 
and energies-can readily comprehend. The ideas about social compromise 
and about how quickly and thoroughly modernity $hould be socially 
assimilated that I probed in part IV seem to me examples of the kind of 
considerations that ought to be part of a resolution of some privacy issues but 
that constitutional law is hard pressed to doctrinally absorb. They thus seem 
to me to exemplify some of the reasons we should be cautious and modest in 
constitutionalizing vice issues in particular and social issues in general. 
139. This is, of course, a problematic kind of autonomy, because it is secured at the cost of the 
comparable autonomy of people who would prefer a different kind of society. However, as I wrote 
earlier, this problem is, to some extent, unresolvable: It is a paradox of autonomy that autonomy 
requires control over one's social environment, but that to achieve that control someone else's 
autonomy must be diminished. 
